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1. Introduction 
1.1 The Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) 
Why have some countries remained reluctant to negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-Off 
Treaty (FMCT)? The FMCT is an envisaged treaty on nuclear non-proliferation and, 
possibly, disarmament. If negotiated, the FMCT will provide a legal ban on the 
production of fissile material1 for weapons purposes and, perhaps, codify substantial 
reductions in the existing stockpiles of such material (hence the wording “possible” 
disarmament treaty). However, so far the FMCT has not been negotiated, and the 
purpose of this thesis is to explore why this is so. 
The reasons why the FMCT has stalemated are manifold and complex. Firstly, the 
international body designated for negotiations, the Conference on Disarmament 
(CD)2 has been unable to negotiate any treaty since 1996. Second, the process of 
arms control negotiations is a difficult one. The FMCT is no exception in this respect, 
as it requires agreement on scope (what material and production facilities the treaty 
should cover), verification (how to detect violations) and enforcement (how to 
respond to violations, e.g. illegal production or diversion of materials). Third, key 
members of the FMCT will be the USA, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, 
India, Pakistan and Israel, all of whom are allowed to produce fissile material for 
weapons purposes today. All have nuclear weapon arsenals, but their size and 
sophistication vary. An obvious problem in this connection is when to set the 
production cut-off date, especially from the viewpoint of those countries with smaller 
and less sophisticated arsenals. How can Pakistan be convinced it has enough fissile 
                                              
1 In every nuclear warhead there is an explosive core (“pit”) of fissile material; either plutonium or highly enriched uranium 
(HEU). 
2 Inevitably, this thesis will contain references to several nuclear non-proliferation treaties and organizations with which the 
reader might not be familiar. A quick introduction to the most important organizations and treaties is presented in Appendix 
1. 
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material vis-à-vis India, and how can India be convinced it has enough vis-à-vis 
China, and how can China be convinced it has enough vis-à-vis Russia and the 
United States? 
Notwithstanding these challenges, this thesis sets out to examine one possible 
explanation why some countries have remained reluctant to the FMCT: Their 
willingness and ability to pay the costs of enforcement. 
1.2 Research question 
“Enforcement” is generally understood as “the use of hard consequences to ensure 
compliance with some behavioural or outcome standard, as laid down in an 
agreement, a rule, a law, a norm or in some other way (Hovi et al. 2005: 7, my 
italics). Two theoretical schools have diametrically differing views about why 
countries generally comply with international agreements, and how one should react 
to non-compliance: the management school and the enforcement school:  
The management school holds the view that compliance is generally quite good; a 
high level of compliance has been achieved with little use of enforcement; those 
problems that do exist are better addressed as management issues rather than 
enforcement problems; and the management rather than the enforcement approach 
holds the key to future regulatory cooperation in the international system (Chayes and 
Chayes 1995).3 
Advocates of the enforcement school on the other hand have argued that the reason 
for the observed high level of compliance is that most international agreements are 
quite “shallow”, demanding little or nothing beyond what the member states would 
have done in their absence. Enforcement, the use or threat of using hard 
consequences, is not necessary under such shallow agreements, according to 
                                              
3 See chapter 3.2 
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enforcement theorists. By contrast, agreements that are “deep” will demand 
provisions for enforcement because the incentives for cheating are big, and increasing 
along with the concessions made by each member state. As a response to the 
management school, Downs et al. (1996: 387) have argued: “We need to worry about 
the possibility that both the high rate of compliance and the relative absence of 
enforcement are due not so much to the irrelevance of enforcement as to the fact that 
states are avoiding deep cooperation (…) because they are unwilling or unable to pay 
the costs of enforcement.” (my italics).4 
This thesis examines whether the above assumption holds when applied to the case of 
FMCT negotiations. To what extent is it unwillingness or incapacity to pay the costs 
of enforcement that makes some states avoid negotiating the FMCT? This is the main 
research question of the thesis, and to examine this we need an appropriate research 
design. 
1.3 Research design 
1.3.1 Case study 
The case-study approach should be suitable for this analysis. Case studies give 
extensive knowledge about the subject of inquiry (Hellevik 1994: 81), and they are 
generally useful for including other contextual conditions that might be of relevance 
to the study (Yin 1994: 13). This is important because, to my knowledge, there have 
been no other in-depth, country-specific studies on the FMCT. There is a general lack 
of information on this subject – a circumstance which in itself warrants an intensive 
case-study approach.  
Further, I have chosen a multiple case study because I wanted to examine and 
compare the FMCT policies of two different states: the United States and Pakistan. 
                                              
4 See chapter 3.3 
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They were chosen because of their relevance as Nuclear-Weapon States, and because 
of their status as “most different” Nuclear-Weapon States. 
With regard to the first criterion, it could be argued that only a handful of states are 
really relevant, because almost all other states are banned from producing fissile 
material for weapons purposes by virtue of their membership under the NPT as Non-
Nuclear Weapon States (see below). There are only eight or possibly nine states 
possessing nuclear weapons today (2005). Of these, only five are recognized as 
Nuclear-Weapon States under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT)5 and by the international community. The United States, Russia, the 
United Kingdom, France and China had all conducted nuclear test explosions prior to 
1 January 1967 and were thus accorded status as Nuclear-Weapon States under the 
NPT.6 All other states were defined as Non-Nuclear Weapon States. As for India, 
Pakistan and Israel, they had not conducted nuclear tests prior to 1 January 1967 and, 
hence could not be accorded status as Nuclear-Weapon states. Nevertheless, they 
clearly possess nuclear weapons and are therefore commonly referred to as de facto 
Nuclear-Weapon States. I will also use these terms in the following. As for North 
Korea, it was a member of the NPT until 2003, when it withdrew from the treaty. In 
February 2005, it declared that it possessed nuclear weapons. However, since this has 
not yet been verified I will not refer to North Korea as a Nuclear-Weapon State in this 
thesis. It is the eight states mentioned above that are most relevant in the context of 
FMCT negotiations: they are the “target states” of the envisaged treaty.  
With regard to the criterion of being most different, the United States and Pakistan 
are, arguably, the most different among the Nuclear-Weapon States: One is the 
“oldest” among the Nuclear-Weapon States (the United States). The other is the 
“youngest” (Pakistan). One is a member of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
                                              
5 See chapter 2. 
6 The NPT states that “For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded 
a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1. 1967.” (NPT Article IX.3, my italics) 
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Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and, thus, formally accorded status as a Nuclear-Weapon 
State by the international community (the United States). The other is not a member 
of the NPT and cannot be accorded status as a Nuclear-Weapon State, but 
nevertheless possesses nuclear weapons (Pakistan).7 One has formally ceased 
production of fissile material for weapons purposes (the United States). The other has 
not (Pakistan). Obviously, there are many other differences as well. The rationale 
behind selecting the two most different countries is to avoid a selection of cases that 
could be biased in favour of support to the hypothesis of Downs et al. 
The analysis here uses a “pattern matching” strategy, where a distinct pattern of 
decisions is predicted on the basis of the theoretical variables and matched with the 
real-life empirical evidence. If these two patterns coincide, the hypothesis is 
confirmed. If not, it is – not confirmed. After the first case has been tested, the second 
case is tested in exactly the same way – “replication” (Yin: 1994). 
In the second part of the analysis I will compare the results of the previous analysis. 
The objective here is to find out which of the two cases, if any, lends the most 
support to the hypothesis of Downs et al., and why.  
1.3.2 Sources 
Another advantage of the case-study approach is that it allows using multiple sources 
of information (Yin 1994: 91). I have employed many different sources in the study 
of United States and Pakistani policies on the FMCT – mostly written documentation 
and interviews, but also some direct observation. 
The written documentation available has largely been the various position papers and 
statements delivered by the two countries’ delegations to the CD, the NPT 
                                              
7 Pakistan performed its first nuclear weapons test in May 1998 – i.e. well after 1 January 1967  
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conferences and elsewhere, as well as interviews with top officials in research 
journals and newspapers. 
I conducted several open-ended interviews and had talks with officials and 
researchers during a field trip to New York and Geneva in the spring of 2004. The 
interviews were open-ended as I was still in the process of gathering information. I 
was fortunate to be a member of the Norwegian delegation to the Third Preparatory 
Committee to the NPT Review Conference (New York) and an observer at the CD 
(Geneva).  
Apart from primary sources, the most valuable source of information have been 
persons at various research institution who have provided valuable information as 
well as their qualified analysis of the two countries’ policies. Three analysts and one 
former State Department official have been of particular importance to the analysis of 
the United States. Three analysts and one former official have been of particular 
importance to the analysis of Pakistan. In addition, I have had the benefit of many 
conversations with Norwegian officials and researchers. 
1.3.3 Some specific methodologal challenges 
Validity 
In order for the conclusions of the thesis to be convincing, the information gathered 
must be of high quality: valid and relevant for illuminating the research question at 
hand (Andersen 1990: 82). To accomplish this, the theoretical terms in the analysis 
have to be operationalized so that they correspond as much as possible with the 
empirical variables. In our analysis, the theoretical concepts which should be of 
importance to a state’s decision on the FMCT – unwillingness and incapability of 
paying the costs of enforcement – were operationalized into variables which could be 
recognized in the empirical evidence presented; i.e. the policies of the United States 
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and Pakistan. To the extent that this was accomplished, the analysis can be said to 
have high construct validity (Yin 1994: 34).8  
Reliability 
The goal of reliability is to minimize the errors and biases in a study (Yin 1994: 36), 
which I have tried to do throughout. However, it cannot be excluded that there have 
been some misreadings and some flawed data registration, and we shall therefore take 
a moment to review some issues below. 
Writing in English, which is not my native language, I may have failed to express 
certain points entirely correctly, and I may have misread others. Further, as I am not a 
specialist, I might have overlooked some technical information, although such 
technical details are not a significant part of the analysis. A more relevant problem 
might have been the tactical behaviour of the actors, which can be difficult for an 
inexperienced researcher to identify and understand. For instance – and this 
observation is certainly not limited to the United States and Pakistan – there is reason 
to query if the representatives of the Nuclear-Weapon States are really as positive to 
negotiating new non-proliferation and disarmament treaties – such as the FMCT – as 
they appear. It is not easy to take a public stance against disarmament. The Nuclear-
Weapon States must continuously assess their policies on a broad array of issues and 
treaties: in relation to their own strategic interests; in relation to other states’ policies; 
in relation to domestic pressures; and in relation to pressures from the international 
community. Often, one may get the impression that, while they do not formally reject 
any issues or new treaties, they do not put much effort into advancing them either. 
Of course, there are situations where public officials are not in a position to talk with 
researchers, for entirely legitimate reasons. For instance, the United States 
representative in Geneva could not speak specifically about the FMCT since the U.S. 
policy was still under review by the government. Instead he spoke in general terms 
                                              
8 See chapter three 
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about his country’s policy on compliance and enforcement regarding non-
proliferation treaties.  
Problems with reliability may be solved by using multiple sources of information and 
methods – triangulation (Yin 1994: 91). I have tried to minimize the number of 
misreadings and biases by using a range of sources, so ensure the best possible 
reliability. 
1.4 Plan 
Throughout the thesis a trade-off has been made between two conflicting goals: 1) 
providing the reader with sufficient information to understand the topic at hand, the 
FMCT; 2) avoiding information overload. 
Chapter Two provides background, outlining the history of nuclear proliferation and 
non-proliferation, including what has happened to date regarding the FMCT. The rest 
of the thesis is more narrowly focused on answering the specific research question: 
Chapter Three outlines the theoretical framework of the thesis which is based on the 
“enforcement model” of compliance, particularly the work of Downs et al. (1995, 
1996). Chapters Four and Five analyse the policies of the United States and Pakistan. 
Chapter Six presents a comparison of the policies of the two countries. Chapter Seven 
is a summary and a conclusion. 
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2. Contextual environment of the FMCT 
negotiations  
2.1 Introduction 
The history of nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation is the story of some states 
who acquired the skills and technology to develop nuclear weapons and vehemently 
prevented other states, in particular their adversaries, from acquiring the same skills 
and technologies. It is also story of increased international cooperation within the 
civilian sector (e.g. in nuclear energy and medicine) along with ever-stronger 
international controls of the nuclear material, equipment and facilities in use. 
Essentially, there is much to be learned from this saga: the motives of those states 
who initially acquired a nuclear weapons capability, and the motives of those who did 
not; the legal obligations which some of the states with nuclear weapon ambitions 
undertook which others could not. The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader 
with a deeper understanding of these motives, considerations and concerns which all 
form part of the context of the FMCT negotiations today. 
The chapter is organized as follows: Sections 2.2 and 2.3 outlines some early efforts 
to develop nuclear weapons and to control fissile material. Section 2.4 deals with the 
development and content of the NPT, which is the single most important legal 
instrument of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Here, in addition to the actual 
legal provisions of the treaty, emphasis is put on explaining the regulatory framework 
of the NPT, much of which can be relevant to a future FMCT regime. Section 2.5 
brings us to the FMCT – its general purpose and provisions, as well as the regulatory 
framework as it is likely to appear when the FMCT is actually negotiated. Lastly, 
section 2.6 summarizes the (minimal) progress so far in negotiating the FMCT. 
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2.2 Early efforts to develop nuclear weapons  
Two technological merits were necessary to develop nuclear weapons in those 
countries that pursued them. One was to be able to produce enough fissile material, a 
“critical mass”, to create a self-sustaining chain reaction. This could be done either by 
irradiating uranium in a reactor and extracting plutonium from the spent fuel through 
a chemical process (“reprocessing”), or by increasing the amount of the uranium 
isotope U235 in natural uranium up to 80 or 90% (“enrichment”), through methods of 
electromagnetic separation or gaseous diffusion.9 The other challenge was to 
assemble an explosive device that could either implode plutonium or force together 
two small amounts of U235, creating nuclear fission and an enormous amount of 
energy.10  
From the late 1930s and onwards, a few states were already exploring the possibility 
of developing nuclear fission weapons. These included the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Japan, the Soviet Union, France and China.  
The United States 
“The decision that the U.S. would see if it could make an atomic bomb was made in 
the deepest secrecy by Franklin D. Roosevelt on October 9, 1941” (Bundy 1988: 3). 
Earlier that year, a British scientific body, the Maud Commission, had delivered its 
clear conclusions “that the scheme for an uranium bomb is practicable and likely to 
lead to decisive results in war”. 11 U235 could be separated and made so as to explode 
                                              
9 Electromagnetic separation and gaseous diffusion are early enrichment technologies. More common today is enrichment 
through centrifuges or laser. For a description of these technologies see www.wikipedia.org 
10 The simplest nuclear weapon design is a “gun-type” weapon: By shooting one sub-critical mass of HEU into another one 
creates a critical mass, which, when bombarded with neutrons, will fission and create the desired explosion. Plutonium is 
,however, not usable in such designs, as it will go critical before the critical mass has been assembled. The solution was to 
create a special trigger device. Chemical explosives will implode the plutonium, creating a larger mass density and 
allowing it to fission and go off. 
11 The Maud Report is printed in Gowing (1964): Interestingly, the British did not believe it possible to construct a nuclear 
weapon until two German refugees, Otto Frisch and Rudolf Peierls, wrote a convincing paper arguing the opposite. 
Eighteen months later the Maud Commission delivered its report, which was based largely on Frisch’s and Peierls’s 
conclusions. 
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with an enormous yield. The production of the necessary amount of materials would 
take approximately two years, and, they warned, would not be beyond the capacities 
of any trained physicist. The commission furthermore recommended that the project 
should be given the highest priority, and that the cooperation with the Americans 
should continue, especially within the field of experimental research (Bundy 1988: 
26–27). Fears that Nazi Germany could manage to make the bomb first underlay this 
urgency, and were also why Roosevelt made his historical decision. With it, British 
theoretical knowledge was merged with U.S. experimental skills and resources into a 
secret nuclear programme later known as the Manhattan Project. On 16 July 1945, the 
first nuclear test explosion ever performed took place at the Trinity site in 
Alamogordo, New Mexico. 
Fears of Nazi Germany being first with the bomb were in fact groundless. Hitler had 
no interest in “modern” weapons like atomic bombs or jet planes. German nuclear 
physicists were indeed brilliant, but they did not want to be involved in the war 
machinery, wishing instead to continue their research on how to make Germany a 
leading nation in the production of nuclear energy. The amount of resources put into 
the German uranium project was one thousandth of the American, according to 
Bundy (1988: 21). Nazi Germany would have been unlikely to succeed even if it had 
tried, not least because of the Allied bombing. 
As for Japan, it did in fact have a very modest programme, but as Bundy (1988: 53) 
concludes: “The Japanese programme was always a small one with a low priority, 
handicapped by shortages, rivalries and bombing attacks, never vitalized by insight 
like that of Frisch and Peierls [the authors of the paper that was to catalyse the British 
and United States, see above], and above all hopelessly outweighed and outclassed by 
the unimpeded and unified effort that went forward in the United States.” 
The Soviet Union 
Also Stalin wanted the bomb. Already by the end of 1942 he authorized a small-scale 
uranium project after having received intelligence information indicating that the 
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Americans and the Germans were moving forward. The project was led by Igor 
Kurchatov. The decision to build a bomb was reportedly made in mid-August 1945, 
one month after the test explosions at the Trinity site. At the Potsdam Conference on 
24 July 1945, President Truman had told Stalin that the United States had developed 
“a new weapon of unusual destructive force”, but Stalin seemed uninterested.12 In 
fact, he was already well informed about the U.S. programme through Soviet spies 
working at the Los Alamos Laboratory. The Soviet nuclear programme went forward 
thanks to information obtained through espionage and open sources,13 but mostly 
because of hard work by Soviet nuclear physicists. 
The United Kingdom 
The British, who had been dependent on U.S. support during the war, continued their 
programme independently and with full strength after the war. The entire political 
and military leadership was behind the project. There was “ a feeling that Britain as a 
great power must acquire all major new weapons, a feeling that atomic weapons were 
a manifestation of the scientific and technological superiority on which Britain’s 
strength, so deficient if measured in sheer numbers of men, must depend.14” The 
United Kingdom performed its first nuclear test in Australia on 3 October 1952, 
without any Americans present. The fact that the British were able to construct a 
bomb on their own gave new impetus to the British–U.S. cooperation, according to 
Bundy (1988: 470–471). 
                                              
12 Truman’s recollection of what happened can be read in H.S. Truman (1995): Year of Decision. Garden City, NY. 
Doubleday, at p. 416, quoted by Bundy 1988: 113 
13 Already on 11 August the Americans released a report documenting the historical development of the Manhattan Project, 
the establishment of the secret laboratories and the fundamental physics involved. No sensitive information was disclosed, 
and so far allegations from some U.S. politicians that the government was “giving away secrets about the bomb” seem 
groundless. The only way this information was used by the Soviets was to confirm that they were on the right track and to 
compare the pace at which they were getting there. 
14 M. Gowing (1974): Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945–1952. London: Macmillan, Vol I: 
Policy Making, at p. 184. Quoted by Bundy 1988: 465  
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France 
“France is not really herself except in the front rank… France cannot be France 
without greatness”, President de Gaulle wrote in the opening paragraph of his 
memoirs from the Second World War.15 It was never acceptable that France could be 
without nuclear weapons. In the early 1950s, the French felt challenged on many 
fronts: by the loss of former colonies, by German re-armament and U.S. support in 
this connection, and by the increased U.S. dominance in the Western Alliance caused, 
France believed, by the U.S. nuclear weapon status. De Gaulle repeatedly advocated 
a new triangular relationship involving France, the United Kingdom and the United 
States, but was turned down by the Americans. The rejection was not so much 
because of Eisenhower himself, who had no problems with the idea of France getting 
a nuclear capacity. Rather it was the U.S. Congress and the Joint Chiefs of Staff who 
were opposed. Eisenhower’s expression of good-will followed by the inability to 
follow up was nevertheless very provoking to de Gaulle. The Kennedy administration 
was even less enthusiastic about proliferation to other countries, including France; 
and by the summer of 1962, there was an unpleasant split between the two countries 
(Bundy 1988: 487). Nevertheless, the French did succeed in constructing a nuclear 
weapon on their own, which they tested in the Sahara on 13 February 1960. 
China 
Mao Zedong’s decision to develop a nuclear weapon was reportedly made on 15 
January 1955, in the midst of the U.S. –Chinese crisis over the islands of Quemoy 
and Matsu. Mao did not like the U.S. rhetoric.16 Talking to his fellow party members, 
he said: “If we are not to be bullied in the present-day world, we cannot do without 
the bomb.”17 Bundy (1988: 527) points out that Mao’s decision was also based on a 
                                              
15 C. de Gaulle (1954–1959): Mèmoires de Guerre. Paris: Libraire Plon. Vol I, at p.1, quoted by Bundy 1988: 473 
16 Eisenhower was convinced that if the United States let these islands fall into the hands of Communist China, Taiwan 
would fall as well, together with all the other islands in the Pacific including Japan (Bundy 1988: 273). As stated by US 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on 8 March 1955, the United States had to “stand firm, and, if necessary, meet hostile 
force with the great force that we possess” – including the use of nuclear weapons. 
17 Peking Review (1977) No. 1: 13, quoted by Bundy 1988: 526 
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deep conviction never again to let any foreign power violate China’s borders, and that 
nuclear weapons were indispensable in this regard. China sought and received Soviet 
assistance during the first years. Between 1955 and 1958 no less than six contracts 
were signed, including support for an enrichment facility and delivery of one nuclear 
weapon. However, the Soviets withdrew from the agreement in 1959 because, in their 
opinion, Mao was too much oriented towards a military and nuclear “solution” of the 
conflict with the capitalists. This move was regarded as an unfriendly act by the 
Chinese, as was Soviet participation in the test ban negotiations, at a time when 
China had not yet developed a weapon. Perhaps most disappointing to the China was 
the lack of Soviet support during the confrontation over Quemoy and Matsu, from 
which the U.S. side emerged victorious. Nevertheless, China did succeed in 
developing its own nuclear weapon device, tested on 16 October 1964. 
2.3 Early efforts to control fissile material 
From early on the Americans persistently tried to interest the Soviets in measures to 
prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries. The first and arguably 
most ambitious proposal was outlined on 14 June 1946, when Bernard Baruch, the 
U.S. representative to the UN Atomic Energy Commission, proposed the 
establishment of an international control system for all civilian nuclear activities, and 
the elimination of nuclear weapon programmes.18 The core idea in what later became 
known as the Baruch Plan was to establish an International Atomic Development 
Authority to govern all nuclear activities in all member states and to ensure, through 
an inspection system, that all nuclear activities were for peaceful purposes only. 
Immediate penal reactions would follow if any member state was caught in violating 
its commitments, and no member would have a right to veto. Significantly, nuclear 
disarmament would follow after the control system had been established and tested. 
                                              
18 The Baruch Plan was largely based on the Acheson-Lilienthal report of March 1946. The plan is available online: 
http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/arms-control-disarmament/baruch-plan_1946-06-
14.htm 
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This was unacceptable to the Soviets, who feared it would take a long time before the 
Americans disarmed, if they chose to do so at all. Instead of an international control 
system, the Soviet representative Andrey Gromyko therefore proposed a total ban on 
the production, possession and use of nuclear weapons. In other words, that the 
United States should disarm first, and then one could talk about establishing 
international control afterwards. The Soviet Union did not accept any foreign or 
international interference in its own allegedly peaceful nuclear programmes,19 and 
was unwilling to be deprived of its right of veto in the Security Council. 
According to Bundy (1988: 184), Stalin was never serious about banning nuclear 
weapons. While it was too dangerous for the Americans to possess them alone, 
nuclear weapons were not so dangerous that some countries might have them, 
including the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, it soon became apparent that the distance 
between the two countries was too great, and that there was no basis for negotiations. 
After six months the process was dead (Bundy 1988: 166). 
“Atoms for Peace” did become a reality: In 1953, President Eisenhower proposed to 
the UN General Assembly an ambitious programme for sharing the benefits of 
nuclear energy worldwide. The Eisenhower administration had entered office with a 
policy of using peaceful nuclear technology to create an even stronger relationship 
between the United States and the countries of Western Europe. This marked a sharp 
reversal of the 1946 Atomic Energy Act which had been intended to secure for the 
United States a monopoly on nuclear weapons, materials and secrets (Bunn 1992: 
84). Under “Atoms for Peace”, the United States and the Soviet Union would provide 
some fissile material for an international agency to be established under the aegis of 
the United Nations.  
                                              
19 The Soviet reluctance was reportedly amply demonstrated during one rare private consultation between the two 
superpowers in 1946: The Americans had argued that the U.S. proposal would apply equally to all nations, whereupon the 
Soviet representative is said to have answered that “The Soviet Union was not seeking equality, but, rather, freedom to 
pursue its own policies in complete freedom and without any interference or control from the outside (Foreign Relations of 
the United States, quoted by Bundy 1988: 167). 
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The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in 1956 and went 
into operation the year after. The central functions of the agency are to “encourage 
and assist research on, and development and practical application of atomic energy 
for peaceful uses throughout the world” (IAEA Statute, Article III A.1.); to 
“administer services, equipment and facilities for the use of member states”, 
including fissile material, and, importantly, to establish and administer safeguards for 
ensuring that none of the equipment or materials provided by the agency is misused 
for military purposes (ibid.). 
 “Atoms for peace” was a success in terms of spreading equipment, materials and 
technology for peaceful use. In the ensuing years, the United States, followed by the 
Soviet Union, France and Canada, exported research reactors and highly enriched 
uranium to several countries throughout the world. Most recipient countries used this 
for peaceful purposes, but some did not: Israel’s reactor at the city of Dimona was 
built with French assistance in the mid-1950s. India imported a research reactor from 
Canada in 1955 and a reprocessing plant from the United States, enabling it to 
produce plutonium from 1964 onwards. Both deliveries were conditioned on the 
assurances of Israel and India that the equipment and the materials would not be used 
to produce nuclear weapons, but there were no verification arrangements involved. 
Israel and India both managed to produce enough plutonium for a nuclear explosive 
device within years.20 In 1965, Pakistan imported a research reactor from the United 
States, which was put under safeguards by the IAEA and could not be misused for 
weapon plutonium production. This meant that Pakistan had to go its own way and 
did not have enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear explosive device until 
1987. The development of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme will be examined 
more closely in Chapter Five. 
                                              
20 By 1967, Israel had, reportedly, produced sufficient material for a nuclear explosive device (Cohen 2005: 8). India had 
obviously done the same by 1974, when it performed its first test explosion. 
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Significantly, the Atoms for Peace programme did not impose on its participants a 
general commitment to refrain from developing nuclear weapons or engaging in 
activities outside the channels of the IAEA and outside safeguards. As such, it was 
clearly insufficient as a non-proliferation measure.21 
2.4 The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT) 
Proliferation in the 1950s led to the establishment of a non-proliferation norm and a 
treaty in the 1960s. In 1962, President Kennedy warned that, on the current path, “by 
1970 there may be ten nuclear powers instead of four, and by 1975, fifteen or 
twenty.”22 China had not yet performed a nuclear weapons test, but Kennedy realized 
that the United States would probably not be able to prevent it from acquiring 
nuclear-weapon capability. Israel and India also had nuclear weapons programmes 
underway. The dividing line, if there was going to be one, between those who could 
have and those who could not have nuclear weapons would had to be drawn at Israel 
(Cohen & McNamee 2005: 7). 
The point of departure for the negotiations of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was a 1958 Irish proposal in which the United States and 
the Soviet Union gradually became interested. However, dispute over other 
agreements prevented any real negotiations from taking place until 1966.23 In 1968, 
the negotiations were concluded, and in 1970 the NPT entered into force. 
                                              
21 President Eisenhower also called the Atoms for Peace programme a “disarmament measure” since the United States and 
the Soviet Union would submit some of their fissile material to peaceful purposes under the IAEA. This was naturally a 
gross overstatement, since the relatively small amounts of fissile material submitted were soon replenished by the two 
countries. 
22 Quoted in Engelhardt, M. (1996): “Rewarding Nonproliferation: The South and North Korean Cases”, The 
Nonproliferation Review Vol. 3 No. 3: 31 
23 For an excellent account of the NPT negotiations,  refer to George Bunn’s Arms Control by Committee, in which he 
describes how discussions over a Multilateral Sea-based Force (MLF) treaty long got in the way of NPT: United States 
State Department officials preferred MLF to NPT. The Soviets were vehemently opposed to an MLF in Europe, as well as 
to deployment of US nuclear weapons under NATO control, under the so-called “two key arrangements”. In the end, the 
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The core provisions of the NPT are the following: (1) Nuclear-Weapon states are not 
to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices… (NPT Article I); (2) Non-Nuclear Weapon States are not to receive nuclear 
weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices from any transferor, and not to 
manufacture or require them (NPT Article II); (3) Non-Nuclear Weapon States are to 
place all nuclear materials in all peaceful activities under IAEA safeguards (NPT 
Article III); (4) all parties are obligated to facilitate and participate in the exchange of 
equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy (NPT Article IV); (5) all parties must pursue negotiations in 
good faith on effective measures related to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and 
to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under 
strict and effective international control (NPT Article VI). Hence, the purpose of the 
NPT was to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons by offering nuclear 
technology and equipment for peaceful use to those states which refrained from 
acquiring nuclear weapons. It also offered member states the assurance that all states 
would work towards nuclear disarmament, i.e. that the asymmetry between Nuclear-
Weapon states and Non-Nuclear Weapon States would be only temporary. 
When it was opened for signature in 1970, 62 states signed the NPT. France declared 
that while it would not sign the agreement, it “would behave in the future in this field 
exactly as the states adhering to the treaty”.24 China also abstained from signing, 
although it too would have been granted Nuclear-Weapon state status as it had 
performed its first test prior to 1 January 1967.25 As for India and Israel, they did not 
                                                                                                                                           
United States gave up its wish for an MLF, the USSR gave up its opposition to the two key arrangements – and NPT 
negotiations could begin. George Bunn was present at the NPT negotiations as a representative of the United States Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency. 
24 France did not show up during the NPT negotiations. George Bunn (personal email communication 2005) explains 
France’s absence with the fact that President de Gaulle ignored many conferences and commitments at that time. France 
eventually did sign the NPT in 1992. 
25 China had not been offered a seat at the then Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (now the Conference on 
Disarmament) and had no interest in negotiating with either the United States or the Soviet Union. China was developing 
its own nuclear weapons capacity and was generally hostile to most of the world, according to George Bunn (personal 
email communication 2005). China did eventually sign the NPT on 9 March 1992. 
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sign the NPT because they considered it discriminatory, as it failed to acknowledge 
them as Nuclear-Weapon States. Pakistan did not sign the NPT because India did not 
sign it. 
 During the 1960s, Israel preceded with its nuclear weapons programme – in secrecy. 
The Israeli response to its non-acknowledgement as a Nuclear-Weapon State was a 
policy of “nuclear ambiguity” where the Israelis abstained from declaring that they 
possessed nuclear weapons, but did not deny it either. India first tested what it termed 
a “peaceful nuclear explosive device” in 1974. With this, while not declaring itself a 
Nuclear-Weapon State, India signalled its capacity for building nuclear weapons. 
Further, the test explosion catalysed efforts in Pakistan to build a nuclear weapon 
programme as well, and in 1998 both countries tested a series of nuclear weapons, 
declaring themselves as de facto (although not acknowledged by the NPT) Nuclear-
Weapon States. As for Israel, it retained its policy of nuclear ambiguity and is not 
known to have tested. 
The French and Chinese eventually signed the NPT in 1992. The NPT is today nearly 
universal: only India, Israel and Pakistan have not signed.  
2.4.1 The verification and enforcement system 
The IAEA was assigned the task of verifying compliance under the NPT. Under 
“Atoms for Peace”, the primary functions of the IAEA were (1) to administer 
services, equipment, facilities and materials for use of member states; and (2) to 
establish and administer a safeguards system to ensure that none of these services etc. 
were misused for military purposes (IAEA Statutes, Article III). Under the NPT, the 
verification (safeguards) mandate of the IAEA was extended to encompassing “all 
nuclear material in all peaceful activities of the Non-Nuclear Weapon States” (NPT 
Article III, my italics), not only those that had been provided for by the IAEA.  
The IAEA performs its verification duties by accounting for all relevant nuclear 
materials and facilities in the Non-Nuclear Weapon States. This is done on the basis 
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of initial declarations of the member states, regular reports and surveillance, as well 
as on-site inspections.26 If the IAEA cannot verify the non-diversion of nuclear 
materials to non-peaceful purposes in a particular member state, it has to report it to 
the other member states. In cases of non-compliance, the IAEA Board of Governors, 
which is the key decision-making body of the IAEA, shall report to the UN Security 
Council and to the General Assembly (IAEA Statutes, Article XII C). If corrective 
action is not taken within reasonable time, the IAEA Board of Governors may also 
direct curtailment or suspension of assistance provided by the agency or other 
member states. It may call for the return of material or equipment made available. 
And it may impose membership sanctions such as denial of agency information – 
although the strength and effectiveness of such sanctions seem dubious.27 
The UN Security Council has considerably greater authority. Under Chapter 6 of the 
UN Charter, the Security Council may, if it finds that the situation created by a 
violation could lead to international friction, recommend to the state or states 
concerned “appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment”. Furthermore, if it 
decides that a specific violation constitutes a “threat to peace”, it may under Chapter 
7 of the Charter, call on UN members to apply sanctions – complete or partial 
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and 
other means of communication. It can recommend to the General Assembly that 
membership sanctions be imposed, even expulsion from the organisation. Ultimately, 
it may impose military sanctions, including demonstrations, blockades and other 
operations by the military forces of UN members. 
                                              
26 Please refer to appendix 1 for a more detailed description of the IAEA safeguards system. 
27 Goldblat (1994: 237): “the IAEA provides very little direct assistance to states – and certainly not for their nuclear power 
programmes.” Concerning curtailment of assistance it is not certain that all member states would support this, since a Board 
of Governor’s decision is not unambiguously mandatory. Withdrawal of used material is not realistic, since it would require 
the cooperation of the transgressing state and the willingness of the supplier state(s) to take it back. And finally, 
membership sanctions such as exclusion from agency meetings are not particularly hurtful. 
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However, a decision to impose sanctions requires a two-thirds majority of the 
members of the Security Council and the support of all the permanent members, 
which may not always be obtainable (Goldblat 1994: 236).  
With regard to Article I – the Nuclear-Weapon States’ commitment not to spread 
nuclear weapons to Non-Nuclear Weapon States – several export control 
arrangements were set up outside the NPT (Goldblat 1994: 86ff). Shortly after the 
treaty entered into force, a group of Western and Soviet bloc exporters began 
consulting on what procedures and standards should apply for export to Non-Nuclear 
Weapon States. The group, known as Nuclear Exporters Committee or the Zangger 
Committee (after its Swiss chairman), agreed on a set of guidelines in 1974, including 
a list of items which would “trigger” application of safeguards in the recipient 
country. Another group was established after the first Indian test explosion in 1974: 
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The NSG, this time with the French on board, 
established procedures and standards similar to those of the Zangger Committee, but 
went further, by restricting the proliferation of sensitive technology and by 
instructing its members to “exercise restraint” in exports of enrichment and 
reprocessing equipment.28 And in 1987 the Missile Technology Control Regime was 
established, to exercise restraint on supplies of “dual-capable” weapons systems, i.e. 
systems capable of delivering both conventional and nuclear weapons.  
Importantly, the export control arrangements are informal and voluntary 
arrangements. The guidelines are not considered as international law. This means that 
when any new guideline is adopted, it will be up to the member states to implement 
and enforce it through their national legal and administrative systems. There are no 
provisions for verification or enforcement among the member states.  
                                              
28 In 1992, after the discovery of the Iraqi nuclear programme, the NSG guidelines were expanded to cover dual-use 
equipment. They were also strengthened through the provision that all peaceful nuclear activities in all recipient countries 
must be under safeguards. In practice this excludes any nuclear exports to India, Israel and Pakistan. 
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As for Article 6, NPT members have no means or methods of verifying or enforcing 
the obligation to halt the arms race, to disarm and to negotiate a treaty on general and 
complete disarmament. Apart from the IAEA, which covers only Articles 2 and 3, the 
regulatory framework of the NPT is generally quite weak. The treaty has no 
secretariat of its own. NPT members meet only once every five years to review 
implementation of the treaty. This “institutional deficit” has been discussed at recent 
Review Conferences, most clearly expressed by Ireland and Canada. The Nuclear-
Weapon States are against the establishment of a separate NPT organization, fearing 
that it would weaken the role of the Security Council.29 Arguably, it would also 
weaken their own influence in enforcing compliance by other states, and, not least, in 
protecting themselves and their allies against charges of non-compliance levied by 
others. A permanent member can veto any decision by the Security Council to take 
action. Consequently, enforcing their compliance is dependent on their own 
willingness to control themselves and each other (Weiss 2003: 21) 
There have been some improvements of the regulatory framework of the NPT. In 
1995, as part of the decision to extend the NPT indefinitely, members agreed on a set 
of principles and objectives for disarmament, including “immediate commencement 
and early conclusion of negotiations” of an FMCT.30 It was also decided to 
strengthen the review process by holding three preparatory committees leading up to 
each Review Conference. The purpose of the preparatory committees (PrepComs) 
would be to “consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full 
implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make 
recommendations thereon to the Review Conference.” At the 2000 Review 
Conference, the disarmament obligations were further specified through a list of 
                                              
29 After the NPT Preparatory Committee in 2004, Rebecca Johnson (2004: 16) reported: “Even before the Canadian 
working paper [“Overcoming the Institutional Deficit of the NPT] was out of the slips, the British Ambassador, David 
Broucher, felt compelled in his opening statement to publicly dismiss ‘calls from some quarters to introduce new NPT 
mechanisms, including annual conferences to replace the PrepComs and a standing bureau of the treaty’. He disagreed with 
the view that such measures could strengthen the NPT arguing that “Mechanisms to tackle proliferation and non-
compliance already exist within the IAEA and the UNSC [UN Security Council].” 
30 Final Document of the 1995 NPT Review Conference: “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and 
Disarmament”. [online] – URL: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org 
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thirteen steps,31 including the “immediate commencement of FMCT negotiations with 
a view to their conclusion within five years”32 
2.5 The Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) 
This brings us to the FMCT. The remainder of this chapter discusses the general 
purpose of the FMCT, its key provisions and the regulatory framework as it is likely 
to appear when such a treaty is eventually negotiated.  
The purpose of the FMCT is to provide a legal ban on the production of fissile 
material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices. Now, as we have seen 
above, the Non-Nuclear Weapon States have already made this commitment under 
the NPT, so the FMCT is exclusively directed at the eight Nuclear-Weapon States 
(acknowledged and de facto). They are the “target states” of the FMCT. 
There is not agreement in the international community about whether the scope of the 
FMCT should be extended to cover more than only future production. Recalling that 
thousands of tonnes of fissile material was produced for military purposes during the 
Cold War, it is important to note that some of the Nuclear-Weapon States, in 
particular the United States and Russia, have HEU and plutonium in abundance. 
Many of the Non-Nuclear Weapon States have therefore argued that the FMCT 
should also lead to reductions in nuclear stockpiles – that the Nuclear-Weapon States 
should declare all relevant materials and facilities in their possession and allow at 
least some it to be submitted to international control by the IAEA. This way one 
could truly reduce the ability of Nuclear-Weapon States to increase their nuclear 
arsenals, and the FMCT would be a nuclear disarmament treaty as well as a non-
                                              
31 Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, p. 13: “The Conference agrees on the following practical steps for 
the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and 
Disarmament”. [online] – URL: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org 
32 Step no. 3 
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proliferation treaty. The problem, however, is that this approach has little or no 
support among the Nuclear-Weapon States.33 Realism therefore suggests that, at least 
initially, the FMCT will be limited to ending future production. Thus, throughout this 
thesis the focus will be on the FMCT as a basic cut-off obligation.  
2.5.1 Verification 
The future verification arrangements of the FMCT will be very important in securing 
compliance by the member states. The system will work in a similar fashion as IAEA 
safeguards in the Non-Nuclear Weapon States today: the Nuclear-Weapon States 
would declare to the verification agency whatever production facilities and material 
they have which are covered by the treaty. The verification agency, most likely the 
IAEA, would then verify that this information is correct; i.e. that no declared facilities 
or material are misused to create nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, 
and that there is no undeclared material or facilities. 
To indicate how a future verification system might look, three approaches to 
verification are discussed below, along with some criteria that may prove useful when 
choosing among the approaches. The three are the limited approach, the focused 
approach and the comprehensive approach to verification.34  
A limited approach would focus on verifying that former military production 
facilities (enrichment plants, reprocessing plants and plutonium production reactors) 
are shut down, decommissioned or converted into civilian use. It would require 
declaration of such facilities and provisions, in order to ensure that the operational 
status which has been reported is correct. In principle this approach would be 
                                              
33 Pakistan has repeatedly stated that an FMCT must “address the issue of stocks”. It is arguable, however, if any of the 
Nuclear-Weapon States – including Pakistan – really want to buy into a treaty that covers previous production. I owe this 
point to Fred McGoldrick. 
34 Different analysts give varying accounts of the choices involved with FMCT verification (see, for instance, du Preez 
2005, Shea 2003a, Schaper 1997 or Fetter & von Hippel 1997). There is no standardized model. The approaches above are 
only to give an impression of what FMCT could look like and of the considerations involved. 
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straightforward and inexpensive, more desirable to those who can accept some 
uncertainty, less acceptable to those who cannot.35  
A focused approach would be wider, and would follow all the fissile material 
produced after the cut-off date for civilian and non-explosive purposes, to ensure that 
none of it is used for nuclear weapons. It would cover (in addition to former military 
production facilities) naval fuel production facilities, civilian fuel production plants 
(enrichment plants, reprocessing plants and plutonium production reactors) and 
research plants, and materials from such facilities. The objective would be to verify 
that no weapons- grade material is used for military purposes, while keeping the costs 
down to the extent possible. However, verification of the non-diversion from naval 
fuel production facilities would raise concerns about intrusiveness, since naval 
authorities are extremely secretive with regard to the composition of submarine fuels.  
The comprehensive approach is the widest alternative, encompassing all former 
military facilities and civilian facilities and fissile material which can possibly be 
used in nuclear weapons. It is similar to IAEA INFIRC/153-type safeguards,36 and 
clearly more focused on reducing uncertainty than on reducing costs. The costs would 
be significantly larger when using this approach, compared to a limited or a focused 
approach. 
A key consideration when choosing among these variants is how effective states 
parties want the verification system to be (i.e. how much or how little uncertainty 
about other states’ compliance they are willing to accept), and how much they are 
willing to pay for it. On one hand, increased effectiveness will give them more 
                                              
35 However, if enrichment or reprocessing plants remain in operation, the monitoring costs and complexities will be much 
greater, in particular if the plants are co-located with other sensitive nuclear weapons-related plants at the site. Special 
monitoring methods and procedures would have to be developed which would not disclose sensitive information at these 
sites (Shea 2003a: 40). 
36 INFIRC/153 is the standard model for safeguards agreement between the IAEA and Non-Nuclear Weapon states. It is 
comprehensive in the sense that it covers all nuclear facilities and materials which can possibly be misused for the 
production of nuclear weapons. The Additional Protocol (INFIRC/540) provides an intensification of the verification effort 
(more access, better technology etc.), and is most likely to be the new verification standard in the future. 
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security about the others’ compliance. On the other hand, this will also increase the 
costs of running the verification system, including their own share of the enterprise.  
Another flipside of effectiveness is intrusiveness: A verification system might be 
considered very effective but, at the same time, too intrusive if the methods and 
procedures involved are such that they may disclose sensitive national security-
related or proprietary information. This is another kind of “costs” which states parties 
take into consideration when assessing a verification system for the FMCT – the 
potential cost in terms of loss of sensitive information. 
I will return to these matters in the next chapter as they are directly relevant to the 
research question of the thesis. Suffice it here to say that FMCT verification will be a 
new experience to the Nuclear-Weapon States. It will be more than a symbolic 
gesture: its provisions will be obligatory – and, somehow, they will be enforced.  
2.5.2 Enforcement 
What will happen in the event of non-compliance? Jean du Preez (2005) argues that a 
conference of states parties should be set up to enforce the treaty.  
[It] would liaise with and receive data reports from the IAEA or another verification 
authority. … [It] would offer opportunities to present the allegations and hear the responses 
of the suspected party. … [It] should have plenipotentiary powers to decide whether to refer 
allegations and evidence to the UN Security Council or to take other measures, such as 
appointing a special panel or judiciary to determine the merit of the allegations and the 
remedies to be effected.  
Hence, it would be a more independent international body than the NPT Review 
Conference, which cannot do much to remedy matters by itself – only refer cases of 
non-compliance to the Security Council. Furthermore, if the Security Council shall be 
available for enforcement through referral by the conference of states parties, there 
are good reasons for not granting its permanent members the right of veto. For one, it 
seems unlikely that the permanent members would endorse punishment of 
themselves. A right of veto would make them “unassailable”. Second, it is not likely 
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that the others, the de facto Nuclear-Weapon States, would accept a situation where 
they are the only parties that can be punished. On the other hand, it may prove even 
more difficult to deprive the permanent members their current veto rights. When the 
UN was set up in 1945 a special responsibility was given to the five permanent 
members. Even though they would probably acknowledge that there is a different 
world today than sixty years ago, they are highly unlikely to be willing to renounce 
this special responsibility. Nor is it likely that they will grant permanent membership 
to all the de facto Nuclear-Weapon States. Despite the on-going debate about 
extension of Security Council membership, so far none of the permanent members 
have signalled support for the candidacy of any of the others.  
The issue of enforcement will be difficult to resolve, not least because of the high 
stakes and the powerful actors involved. In more than one way, the FMCT would 
begin a new era: one with international control of nuclear weapons disposal and 
disarmament. 
2.6 FMCT negotiations so far  
Following a United States initiative37, the UN General Assembly in 1993 adopted a 
consensus resolution which called for “the negotiation in the most appropriate 
international forum of a non-discriminatory, multilateral, internationally and 
effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear 
weapons and nuclear explosive devices.”38 The Conference on Disarmament (CD), 
recognized as “the single multilateral disarmament forum of the international 
community”, assumed responsibility of negotiating the treaty, and in 1994 Canadian 
                                              
37 Speaking to the UN General Assembly in September 1993, President Clinton declared: “We will pursue new steps to 
control the material for nuclear weapons. Growing global stockpiles of plutonium and highly enriched uranium are raising 
the danger of nuclear terrorism in all nations. We will press for an international agreement that would ban production of 
these materials forever.” Quoted in “The FMCT Handbook: A Guide to a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty” p. 12, by the 
Oxford Resarch Group [online] – URL: http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org 
38 UN General Assembly resolution 48/75L, “Prohibition of the production of fissile materal for nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices.” [online] – URL: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r075.htm 
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Ambassador Gerald Shannon was appointed Special Negotiator to “seek the view of 
its member states on the most appropriate arrangements to negotiate.” 
A mandate was found, but it was a “weak and incomplete negotiating mandate” that 
failed to settle the most important issue (Rauf 1999): whether the treaty should ban 
only future production or, also deal with earlier production of fissile material for 
weapons purposes. During consultations, several Non-Nuclear Weapon States argued 
in favour of banning existing stockpiles as well as future production, to which the 
acknowledged Nuclear-Weapon states and India were strongly opposed. The 
maximum agreement possible at the time was a mandate which did not preclude any 
delegation from raising other issues during the negotiations, including the issue of 
stocks. This was not sufficient to begin negotiations. 
In 1998, CD members actually did establish an ad hoc committee and began 
negotiations on the basis of the Shannon mandate. It was after the Indian and 
Pakistani test explosions that both states endorsed negotiations, and Israel was 
convinced by the United States to go along. However, the negotiations lasted only 
three weeks before the session ended. The mandate was not approved the year after, 
nor has it been approved since that time. 
One reason for the FMCT stalemate is that its negotiations have fallen “victim” to 
linkages with other treaties. To formally negotiate or even discuss a treaty, CD 
members have to agree on a programme of work for each session. The programme of 
work is composed of mandates outlining discussions or negotiations on selected 
topics (such as the FMCT). Since the CD operates by consensus it takes only one 
member to block agreement on the programme of work and, thus, negotiations. 
 The consensus rule also allows each member to link different treaties together by 
demanding package solutions. Between 1996 and the test explosions, India, along 
with a group of other states, insisted that a disarmament committee had to be 
established in the CD to negotiate a treaty on phased reductions of nuclear weapons 
in parallel with the FMCT negotiations. The Indian argument was the same as that 
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put forward during the CTBT negotiations: India cannot commit itself to ending 
fissile material production (or nuclear weapons testing) as long as the other Nuclear-
Weapon States’ stockpiles and weapons inventories are so much larger and advanced 
than India’s. This linkage was eventually given up after the Indian test in 1998, but in 
the following year China introduced a new linkage, demanding that a treaty on 
preventing an arms race in outer space (PAROS) should be negotiated in parallel with 
the FMCT.39 The United States was opposed to this, claiming “there is no arms race 
in outer space.”40 
Along with these linkages, there have been several attempts to overcome them. In 
2002, a balanced proposal for a programme of work was collectively submitted by 
the Ambassadors of Algeria, Belgium, Chile, Colombia and Sweden – the A5 
proposal.41 The A5 proposal gained support from all members but one, the United 
States, who could not support FMCT negotiations on the basis of the Shannon 
mandate. It seemed that the CD was on the verge of a breakthrough which could have 
led to substantial discussion on a range of arms control issues including the FMCT, 
but this failed.  
FMCT negotiations will begin only when all CD members can agree on a programme 
of work and on the value of the treaty itself. The commencement and – not least – 
conclusion of negotiations will also require agreement among all members as to the 
scope, verification and enforcement of the treaty.  
                                              
39 See chapter 4.3.4: China is deeply concerned about the US plans to develop advanced missile defense systems.: The 
demand for PAROS is a diplomatic effort to dovetail this process because Chinese authorities fear that US missile defense 
systems could significantly reduce China’s deterrence capacity and its strategic position in Asia.  
40 See Boese (2000): “Interview with Ambassador Robert T. Grey”. Ambassador Grey: “The United States does not think 
that negotiations on outer space is a proposal that makes any sense. There is no arms race in outer space at all.” 
41 Conference on disarmament (2003): “Initiative of the Ambassadors Dembri, Lint, Reyes, Salander and Vega. Proposal of a 
Programme of Work ”, CD 1693, [online]. – URL: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/A5.pdf   
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2.7 Summary 
In this chapter I have summarized a series of key events, treaties and organizations 
which are important for understanding the context of FMCT negotiations today. The 
non-proliferation regime created, for better or worse, two categories of member 
states; the Nuclear-Weapon States and the Non-Nuclear Weapon States, and placed 
the peaceful activities of only the latter group under international control. The FMCT 
is an attempt to advance international control in the Nuclear-Weapon States by 
ensuring that they no longer produce fissile material for weapons purposes. This will 
also apply to the de facto Nuclear-Weapon States, which are outside the NPT but may 
become members of the FMCT. However, there are obstacles to negotiations, in 
particular the linkage problem and the continuing stalemate of the CD.  
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3. Reasons for avoiding deep agreements – a 
theoretical framework 
3.1 Introduction 
The objective of this thesis was to answer one particular research question, namely 
whether it is unwillingness and incapacity to pay the costs of enforcement which 
makes some states avoid the FMCT. In this chapter we will undertake the first step of 
the pattern matching-strategy, which is to outline a pattern based on the theoretical 
concepts above. “Unwillingness” and “incapacity” need to be operationalized so that 
they can be recognized in the empirical material. To do this we need to start with the 
general theory on which the hypothesis of Downs et al. is based: the enforcement 
model of compliance. 
However, as the enforcement model is in many ways a response to another theoretical 
model on compliance, the management model, we will need to devote some space to 
explaining this model as well. The management model will not be used further in the 
analysis other than as a contrasting perspective to the enforcement model. It is the 
enforcement model that will be our primary research tool. 
The chapter is organized as follows: Sections 3.2 and 3.3 outline the management 
model and the enforcement model. Section 3.3 also outlines the variables of the 
analysis – reasons which a state may have for avoiding a deep agreement. 
3.2 The management model 
Going back to the recommendations of Machiavelli, a traditional realist assumption 
has been that states cannot be expected to honour their commitments unless it is in 
their best interest to do so. In the words of the Italian renaissance adviser: “[A] 
prudent ruler cannot keep his word, nor should he, where such fidelity would damage 
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him, and the reasons that made him promise are no longer relevant.” (Machiavelli 
1988: 61–62) This line of thought is echoed in a more recent contribution by 
Morgenthau (1978: 560): “In my experience [states] will keep their bargain as long as 
it is in their interest.”   
A heated debated was therefore set off when international law theorists launched their 
ideas about compliance in the early 1990s. Chayes and Chayes (1991, 1993, 1995), in 
particular, argue that states in general have a propensity to comply because of 
considerations to efficiency, interests and norms.42 Admittedly, there will be 
instances of non-compliance, but these are mainly the result of ambiguous rules, lack 
of capacity to implement the rules, or changed social or economic circumstances to 
which the offender had not yet adapted. It is these problems which have to be 
managed by member states – not by threats of hard consequences, but by a 
“compliance strategy”. 
Chayes and Chayes emphasize three elements which will help member states comply 
with their commitments. The first, transparency, is of particular importance as it 
facilitates coordination of the interpretation and implementation of norms, provides 
reassurance about compliance by other parties, and serves as a deterrent to those 
actors might contemplate violating the agreement (Chayes & Chayes 1995: 2). 
Second, financial and technical assistance from richer to poorer states can help the 
latter to overcome their lack of capacity to implement the rules. Third, dispute 
                                              
42 States generally have a propensity to comply for three reasons: (1) Consideration of efficiency: “Decisions are not free 
goods”, Chayes & Chayes (1995: 4) explain. Bureaucratic organisations will always try to save time and resources for 
making and changing policies when they need to. It is therefore not practically feasible or economically wise for a 
government to routinely review and change its policy on the basis of a rational cost/benefit analysis. More likely is that 
governments will comply, and the consideration of efficiency will prevail. (2) Consideration of interests: Treaties are 
consensus-based (Chayes & Chayes 1995: 4). They are necessarily a result of a negotiation compromise where everybody 
was left with something in return, if not equally much. They are also the result of an interactive two-level process where a 
government’s position is developed and changed in cooperation with many other governmental and non-governmental 
actors, discussed and influenced at the international level and re-negotiated at the national level. In the end, this two-level 
game will, to some extent, ensure that the treaties which are negotiated reflect national interests which themselves have 
been influenced and re-shaped in the process (Chayes & Chayes 1995: 6). (3) Consideration of norms: Most actors, Chayes 
and Chayes (1995: 8) argue, feel committed to legally binding obligations unless there are strong countervailing 
circumstances. So do states.  
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resolution mechanisms will help member states to manage situations related to 
compliance and non-compliance in an open and non-confrontational way. Persuasion 
and arguments are the impetus of this process, and it is important that the accused 
state should be allowed to explain itself at every step. If the accused cannot argue 
convincingly that its breach of the rules has been due to the problems mentioned 
above, there will be consequences in form of criticism or pressure for adaptation. If 
the accused state will not follow the directions of the community, this can lead to 
various kinds of punishment such a shaming or exposure, or in some cases, the use of 
military and economic sanctions (Chayes & Chayes 1995: 28). 
On a routine basis, however, sanctions are not very useful for inducing compliance, 
because of their high costs and lack of legitimacy. Chayes and Chayes (1995: 2) 
explain:  
The costs of military sanctions are measured in lives, a price contemporary publics seem 
disinclined to pay except for the most urgent objectives, clearly related to primary national 
interests. The costs of economic sanctions are also high, not only for the state against which 
they are directed, where sanctions fall mainly on the weakest and most vulnerable, but also 
for the sanctioning states. When economic sanctions are used, they tend to be leaky. Results 
are slow and not particularly conducive to changing behaviour. The most important cost, 
however, is less obvious. It is the serious political investment required to mobilize and 
maintain a concerted military or economic effort over time in a system without any 
recognized or acknowledged hierarchically superior authority. 
 
According to the management model, states will generally comply with their 
international obligations if they are able to do so. Non-compliance, to the extent that 
it is a problem, can generally not be solved through enforcement, i.e. by employing 
hard consequences. 
3.3  The enforcement model 
By contrast, the enforcement model generally sees enforcement as a precondition for 
ensuring compliance under international agreements. Downs et al. (1996) argue that 
enforcement is necessary to the extent that the agreement is “deep”. Depth is defined 
as “the extent to which it [the agreement] requires states to depart from what they 
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would have done in its absence.” (Downs et al. 1996: 383) The deeper the agreement, 
the greater the incentives for defecting, and correspondingly, the greater the need for 
enforcement (ibid: 386). They illustrate this point with a graph showing how the 
degree of necessary enforcement increases exponentially with the depth of 
cooperation. They explain that the punishment for a violation does not need to be fair 
in the sense of corresponding with the damage inflicted on the injured party (tit-for-
tat). Rather it must constitute a sufficient disincentive which would deprive the 
violator of the potential benefits of a violation. As such it should correspond to the 
violator’s benefits, and not to the loss of the injured. The form of the punishment is 
not important either, although Downs et al. note that decentralized enforcement 
arrangements are more often effective that multilateral ones.  The reason is that 
international institutions are generally weak, and that it is difficult to mobilize the 
support for sanctions within such organizations. (Downs et al. 1996) 
It is on this basis that Downs et al. ask if the assumptions of the management model 
about high levels of compliance despite of no enforcement could be misleading:  
We need to worry about the possibility that both the high rate of compliance and relative 
absence of enforcement are due not so much to the irrelevance of enforcement as to the fact 
that states are avoiding deep cooperation (…) because they are unwilling or unable to pay the 
costs of enforcement (Downs et al. 1996: 387, my italics). 
The theoretical concepts of the hypothesis can be displayed like this (Figure 1): 
      
In the remainder of this chapter these theoretical concepts will be operationalized.  
Unwillingness or incapacity 
to pay the costs of 
enforcement 
The states will avoid deep 
cooperation 
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3.3.1 Concerns about non-compliance 
Unlike the management model, the enforcement model presumes that states generally 
do not violate their commitments by accident or because of lack of capacity for 
implementation, but because they calculate the odds of getting detected and punished. 
If the benefits of a violation are likely to exceed the costs of punishment, a rational 
state will proceed with it. It is not a question of efficiency, interests or norms, but of 
incentives. Hence, during negotiations there is a common understanding and 
expectation among negotiating parties that non-compliant behaviour will occur 
among the states that eventually become members of the treaty. They know that 
under special circumstances – if domestic pressure is weighty enough – they 
themselves might have to violate the treaty. And they know that other governments 
calculate in the same way. The key is to develop an effective but moderate 
enforcement regime. 
3.3.2 Concern about the costs of enforcement 
Downs et al. (1995: 91) use the following example: States A and B are both 
considering an agreement. They both know that they may have to violate the same 
agreement later on due to pressure from domestic interest groups. Hence, state A will 
seek to avoid vigorous enforcement for its own sake, as well as for the sake of 
cooperation with B: A does not want B’s punishment to be harder than that B can 
recover and return to the cooperation, which A knows that B wants to do. They will 
both seek to adjust the level of penalties “high enough to prevent constant defection 
but low enough to allow self-interested defection when circumstances demand it 
(Downs et al. 1996: 399).43 If this is not possible, they will not sign the agreement. 
                                              
43 A similar argument is advanced by Hovi & Holtsmark (forthcoming), who claim that a state that is concerned about 
compliance on its own part and the hard punitive consequences which may follow, will either (1) object to the adoption of 
such a [enforcement] mechanism and refuse to ratify it if it is nevertheless established; (2) give its approval only after the 
mechanism has been watered down to an extent that renders it toothless, or (3) insist on the provision of a loophole that 
renders the mechanism’s “teeth” harmless to the country in question. The difference is that in Hovi & Holtmark’s model 
states do not consider the possibility of moderate sanctions, as they do in the model of Downs et al. 
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Neither state wants to risk vigorous enforcement, nor will they accept a situation 
where the agreement is constantly being violated by others.  
From the above we note that the concern about non-compliance and the costs of 
enforcement are interlinked and are likely to have a strong impact on whether states 
are willing to accede to deep international agreements. A third factor is the perceived 
costs of verification. 
3.3.3 Concerns about the costs of verification 
Verification is “assessment of the completeness and accuracy of compliance-related 
information (…) and its conformity with pre-established standards for reporting”, and 
as such is the very baseline of any assessment of whether performance matches 
commitments (Hovi et al. 2005a: 5–6).44 However, this activity is not free of costs, 
and states may be worried about their own contribution to the system as well as the 
consequences of being verified.  
We can differentiate between two types of verification costs: those that each member 
state has to pay for the establishment and operation of the verification system, and the 
potential consequences of verification in terms of loss of sensitive information. The 
first type relates to the verification of others, the second to verification being applied 
on oneself. 
Regarding the cost of verifying others, the purpose of this activity is obviously to get 
additional information about other states’ compliance with the agreement. Thus, if the 
verification regime does not bring additional information other than what is already 
available through other unilateral sources,45 it is not very helpful, at least from a 
                                              
44 The definition of verification is borrowed from Loreti et al. (2001): An Overview of Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Verification Issues, Arlington, VA: Pew Center on Global Climate Change. p 3 
45 Unilateral sources of verification are often referred to as National Technical Means of verification, or NTMs. NTMs are 
based on technical solutions such as radars and satellites, and on human intelligence sources, such as information from 
diplomats, intelligence and various open sources. 
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single state’s point of view. The key is to find out exactly how much resources to 
spend in order for the feedback to be optimal – in other words, cost-effective 
verification. 
As for the other kind of costs, there are basically two categories of information that 
governments do not want to see disclosed: One is national security-related, which in 
the context of the FMCT could be weapon designs, nuclear submarine fuel 
compositions and, more general information about military weaknesses and 
dispositions. The other is commercial information, which in the nuclear industry 
could be reactor designs, centrifuge designs, research results on radioisotopes for the 
nuclear medicine etc. Prior to and during negotiations, there is likely to be 
considerable pressure on the governments not to allow verification arrangements 
which may compromise such sensitive information. While there are ways to 
accommodate such concerns about intrusiveness, it is important to note that such 
pressure may have considerable effect on the government’s decision about 
verification. The question that the government must ask itself is whether or not it can 
accept such potential costs and they way they are dealt with. 
So far we have outlined three variables – possible reasons that a state may have for 
avoiding the FMCT. A fourth variable will be added below – participation. 
3.3.4 Concerns about participation 
Downs (1996: 399) argue that to reduce the instances of non-compliance and, hence 
the costs of enforcement, the negotiating states might try to limit membership to those 
states who would not have to violate the treaty under normal circumstances – in other 
words, to exclude those states who do not have the ability to comply.  
However, this strategy may be at odds with another goal, that of full participation: 
i.e. that all relevant states parties – target states – become members. It is entirely 
conceivable that some states will not even agree to negotiations if some of the other 
target states are left out and/or are not willing to negotiate. Thus, the demand for full 
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participation seems to offer an alternative, albeit related, explanation to why some 
states avoid a deep agreement. 
The four independent variables of the analysis are displayed in Figure 2.46 
 
Figure 2 shows the various reasons a state may have for avoiding a deep agreement: 
First, it may be concerned about non-compliance (its own and others), and this will 
affect its views about the costs of verification and enforcement and, thereby, its 
decision about the agreement under consideration. Second, participation may be of 
importance indirectly (if cost reduction is an option) or directly (if full participation is 
the only option) for the decision on the agreement. 
The dependent variable of the analysis is the states’ decision about the FMCT. Does 
the FMCT qualify as a deep agreement, then? The answer is yes: The FMCT is a 
deep agreement because it requires that some of the states involved would have to go 
far beyond what they would have been doing in its absence, i.e. to keep on producing 
fissile material for weapons purposes. 
                                              
46 The boxes and arrows in the model are only indications of the focus of the analysis, not claims about causality. A model 
describing how the variables are actually linked would be far more complex. 
Decision about a 
deep agreement 
(FMCT) 
Concern about the 
costs of verification 
Concern about the 
costs of enforcement 
Concern about non-
compliance 
Concern about 
participation 
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3.4 Summary 
In this chapter I have outlined the theoretical model on which Down et al. base their 
hypothesis. Further, I have operationalized the theoretical concepts of the hypothesis 
into four variables – reasons which may explain why some states avoid the FMCT, 
namely (1) concern about non-compliance; (2) concern about the costs of 
verification; (3) concern about the costs of enforcement; and (4) concern about 
participation. They will structure the analysis in the following. 
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4. The United States 
4.1 Introduction 
Using the pattern outlined in the previous chapter we shall examine whether there is 
support for the hypothesis of Downs et al. when applied to the case of United States 
policy. Section 4.2 briefly outlines the historical production of fissile material for 
military purposes in the United States, to give the reader some background on the 
issue. Section 4.3 analyses current U.S. policy on the FMCT, with the main focus on 
the policy of the Bush administration from 2001. There will also be some retrospect 
on the policy of the Clinton administration, where is relevant. 
4.2 Historical production of fissile material for military 
purposes in the United States 
The United States has produced both highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium 
to fuel its weapons programme. 
4.2.1 HEU production 
The first gaseous diffusion plant for the production of highly enriched uranium was 
established in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, in 1942.47 In the mid-1950s other plants were 
established in Kentucky and Ohio. The production rate increased rapidly in the 
1950s, and peaked in 1961 with an annual production of 80 tonnes of weapons-usable 
                                              
47 A gaseous diffusion plant is used to ”enrich” uranium so that it contains a higher concentration of the uranium isotope 
U235 than that found in natural uranium, which is only 0.71%. Gaseous diffusion is but one method of uranium 
enrichment. More recent methods include laser enrichment and centrifuge enrichment. For a description of these methods 
see http://www.wikipedia.org 
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uranium.48 Almost all the material produced before 1964 was for weapons purposes. 
The civil nuclear industry was still in its infancy, and demand was correspondingly 
low (Albright et al. 1997: 81). 
In 1964, the production of HEU for weapons purposes ceased. The United States had 
HEU in abundance, and could even export some of it to the United Kingdom.49 The 
Oak Ridge plant alone had produced more than 483 tonnes of HEU (Albright 1997: 
83). In 1990, there were plans to restart production, but these were cancelled a year 
after. The production of HEU for naval purposes (submarine fuel) did continue on a 
large scale after 1964, as did production for space and research reactors, albeit on a 
much smaller scale. In November 1991, the United States declared that, as of 1992, it 
would suspend the production of HEU for all purposes, and that the future needs for 
naval and research reactor would be met from already existing stocks (ibid.). 
Today, the United States has an estimated stockpile of 480 tonnes of weapons-usable 
uranium (Institute of Science and International Security 2003).50 In addition, it has an 
estimated stockpile of 100 tonnes assigned to naval propulsion (submarine fuel). 
Approximately 123 tonnes have been declared excess to defence needs,51 and 10 
tonnes are under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. The significance 
of these figures is that, of the 480 tonnes of HEU which the United States currently 
possesses, only 1.4% has been submitted to international control. 
                                              
48 Weapons-usable uranium is enriched so that it contains more than 90% of U235. Other classifications are HEU (more 
than 20% U235), Low enriched uranium (LEU, more than 0.71% but less than 20% U235), natural uranium (0.71% U235), 
and depleted uranium (less than 0.71% U235) 
49 Since halting its production of HEU in 1962, the UK has imported HEU from the United States under a bilateral 
agreement. 
50 http://www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/tableofcontents.html 
51 174. 3 tonnes were declared in excess in 1994. Since then more material has been declared in excess, and some of the 
excess material has been downblended together with lower enriched uranium for use as fuel in power and research reactors. 
The U.S. Department of Energy has not updated the figures from 1994, but the ISIS estimate the remaining excess material 
to some 123 tonnes. 
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4.2.2 Plutonium production 
According to Albright et al. (1997: 37), the production of weapons plutonium took 
place in four different phases. During the first phase, from the mid-1940s to the mid-
1960s, a total of 14 reactors were constructed and operated: nine at the Hanford 
Reservation in Washington State, and five at Savannah River, North Carolina. In the 
early 1960s, production peaked at six tonnes of plutonium annually. By 1965, a total 
of 60 tonnes, or three quarters of the historical U.S. weapons plutonium production, 
had already been produced. By then it was also about time to replace the plutonium in 
some of the older warheads. In the second phase, 1965–1971, only small amounts of 
material were produced. Old material was recycled and put into the new warheads, 
and the reactors were used to produce electricity. In the third phase, 1973–1981, 
production was restarted up to the level of one tonne a year. New warheads were, 
however, still equipped with old recycled material. The fourth phase, 1982–1988, 
began with ambitious plans to expand production, in a step towards nuclear 
rearmament against the Soviet Union after its invasion of Afghanistan. In reality, the 
increase in production was relatively modest, reaching about two tonnes a year in the 
mid-1980s (ibid.). In 1988, the United States suspended production of plutonium for 
all purposes, although this was not made public until 1992. The suspension was a 
result of the Chernobyl disaster and because of East–West rapprochement. The 
Hanford and Savannah River reactors were closed down. There was no production 
for non-military purposes, also not of tritium or other radioisotope production. 
Today, the United States has a total stockpile of 99.5 tonnes of plutonium (United 
States Department of Energy 1996). Half of it, 52.5 tonnes, has been declared in 
excess of national defence needs. The remainder, some 47 tonnes, is still inside 
nuclear weapons or is available for military use and reuse and the Pantex plant in 
Texas. An additional two tonnes, or 2% (sic!), of the plutonium stockpile, has been 
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submitted to safeguards by the IAEA (Institute of Science and International Security 
2003)52  
4.3 United States policy on the FMCT 
Although Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Rademaker (2003) in an interview in 
2003 referred to the FMCT as a treaty that the United States “in particular favors 
negotiating”, the Bush administration did not enter office as enthusiastic FMCT 
supporters, according to a former State Department official.53 A prominent example 
is the United States National Strategy To Combat Weapons Of Mass Destruction 
(2002: 4), which (only) supports negotiations of an FMCT “that advances U.S. 
security interests”.54 
This “security interests” clause was fully displayed when the United States had to ask 
for a break in the (not yet formally commenced) FMCT negotiations in autumn 2003. 
Previously that year all CD members, including Russia and China, had signalled their 
acceptance of the A5 proposal for a programme of work, which also included FMCT 
negotiations on the basis of the Shannon mandate. The United States was the only 
hold-out when it declared a policy review would first have to be conducted: “We are 
looking at the threshold question, does an FMCT make sense?” Rademaker explained 
in an interview with Arms Control Today in January 2004 (Boese 2004c: 42). He 
could not say when the review would be concluded. 
Foreign diplomats and analysts were surprised by this move since the FMCT had 
largely been a U.S. initiative. Ten years earlier, in September 1993, President Clinton 
                                              
52 [online]. – URL: http://www.isis-online.org 
53Personal email communication with Fred McGoldrick, 2004. McGoldrick is a nuclear expert and coordinator on FMCT 
issues in the early to mid-1990s in the US State Department 
54 Another example is the speech which President Bush held at the National Defense University in February 2004. In his 
speech, President Bush proposed to limit proliferation of fissile material production facilities to those states which already 
possessed them, but he made no mention of the FMCT (du Preez 2005). 
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had announced to the UN General Assembly: “We will pursue new steps to control 
the material for nuclear weapons. Growing global stockpiles of plutonium and highly 
enriched uranium are raising the danger of nuclear terrorism in all nations. We will 
press for an international agreement that would ban production of these materials 
forever”.55  The Clinton administration put considerable political and diplomatic 
pressure behind its effort to get FMCT negotiations started. The Bush administration 
had previously criticized other states for linking the FMCT with other treaties and 
preventing it from being negotiated.56 Now they questioned if it made sense. 
The Bush administration’s FMCT policy review took almost a year. It was 
commissioned to the Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) which 
employs many former United States government officials and often conducts research 
on behalf of the State and Defence Departments.57 On 29 July 2004 U.S. Ambassador 
to the CD Jackie Sanders (2004) announced the outcome of the review, reaffirming 
the U.S. commitment to negotiations: “[T]he United States reaffirms our commitment 
to the negotiations in the CD of a legally binding treaty banning the production of 
fissile material for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosives.” The FMCT should, 
however, have a clean mandate; i.e. the United States could not accept “linkages to 
other unrelated proposals for CD Ad Hoc Committees” [such as treaties preventing 
an arms race in outer space, nuclear disarmament or negative security assurances], 
nor should it have a verification mechanism.  
Interestingly, this announcement was made shortly after U.S. presidential candidate, 
the Democratic Senator John Kerry, had stated his strong support of rapid 
commencement of FMCT negotiations.58 The timing of the announcement suggests 
                                              
55 Quoted in “The FMCT Handbook: A Guide to a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty” p. 12, by the Oxford Resarch Group 
www.oxfordresearchgroup.org 
56 See for instance a Washington File interview with Assistant Secretary Rademaker on 4 March 2003: 
http://usembassy.state.gov/posts/in1/wwwhpr0305a.html 
57 Personal email communication with George Bunn, July 2005 
58 “America must lead an international coalition to halt, and then verifiably ban, all production of highly enriched uranium 
and plutonium for use in nuclear weapons – permanently capping the word’s nuclear weapons stockpiles”, Senator John 
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that Senator Kerry’s statement spurred the completion of the policy review, which 
otherwise might have taken even longer. There has been widespread belief that the 
neo-conservatives in the Bush administration did not want any FMCT whatsoever.59 
They were particularly concerned about the prospects of intrusive verification under 
the treaty. However, the White House overruled these objections, deciding, at least 
officially, that negotiating an FMCT would be in the security interests of the country. 
Another interesting note on the “evolutionary” character of the United States position 
is that former Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, 
John Bolton, was approved by President Bush on August 5 as the next U.S. 
Ambassador to the UN. A staunch critic of international treaties, Mr Bolton was 
perceived by many as the bottleneck against new arms control agreements, and it is 
expected that several positions will be reviewed by the State Department after his 
departure for the UN posting. In fact, it has been signalled that another review of the 
FMCT is already underway.  
However, the purpose of this analysis is to investigate the policy of the United States 
to see if there is support for the present hypothesis that states will not accede to deep 
international agreements if they have concerns about non-compliance, the costs of 
verification and enforcement and participation. We will proceed with this analysis in 
the following. 
4.3.1 Concerns about non-compliance? 
The United States does not seem to be concerned about its own ability to comply with 
an FMCT. Awash with fissile material produced during the Cold War, the United 
States shut down its production facilities a long time ago and has observed a 
moratorium on weapons material production since 1992. 
                                                                                                                                           
Kerry stated at a meeting in West Palm Beach, Florida, 1 June 2004. Senator Kerry’s speech is available at 
http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2004/06/01_kerry_remarks-florida.htm 
59 Personal communication. Name withheld on request. 
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However, the United States has expressed some concern about other states’ ability to 
comply under an FMCT, as it would involve some states with “very, very poor 
records of compliance with their other obligations”, Assistant Secretary of State Paula 
Desutter has acknowledged. Presumably she was referring to Iran and North Korea, 
but perhaps also to India, Israel and Pakistan (Boese 2005b). 
The Clinton administration did not express such concerns. Rather it spoke positively 
about integrating the non-NPT states into the nuclear non-proliferation regime, 
capping a nuclear arms race in South Asia, and preventing one from taking place in 
the Middle East. More importantly it put considerable pressure on India, Pakistan and 
Israel not to block negotiations in the CD. For instance, after the Indian and Pakistani 
nuclear tests in 1998, the Clinton administration immediately imposed sanctions. It 
led a series of top-level consultations throughout 1998 and 1999 to convince the two 
countries to impose a moratorium on the future production of fissile material for 
weapons purposes.60 Since both countries showed a willingness to accommodate to 
these demands, many of the sanctions were lifted already in November 1998 (White 
House Office of the Press Secretary 1998). 
Israel proved a tougher nut to crack. In autumn 1998 the United States exercised 
strong diplomatic pressure to convince Israel not to block FMCT negotiations. 
However, Israel made it clear that, even if it went along, a decision to actually join 
the treaty would be entirely of Israel’s making. According to Haaretz journalist Aluf 
Benn, then Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wrote two letters to President 
Clinton in 1998, saying that “We will never sign the treaty, so do not delude 
yourselves, no pressure will help. We will not sign the treaty because we will not 
commit suicide.”61 
                                              
60 Other US demands were (1) join the CTBT, (2) demonstrate prudence and restraint in the development, flight testing and 
storage of ballistic missiles and nuclear-capable aircraft and (3) strengthen their export control (Talbott 1999)  
61 Quoted by Miller & Scheinmann (2003), fn 4. 
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Thus, the Clinton administration was considerably more optimistic about the 
prospects of India, Pakistan and, perhaps, Israel acceding to and complying with the 
FMCT than the current Bush administration would appear to be. 
4.3.2 Concerns about the costs of verification? 
From the previous chapter, we will recall that there are two kinds of verification 
costs: those of being verified (potential loss of sensitive information), and those of 
verifying others (contributions to the verification system). Both seem relevant in the 
United States context.  
In her 29 July statement, Ambassador Sanders (2004) said that the policy review had 
raised “serious concerns that realistic, effective verification of an FMCT was not 
achievable”. She did not specify any reasons why, but a State Department press 
guidance released the same day shed some light on the matter: “Effective verification 
of an FMCT would require an inspection regime so extensive that it could 
compromise key signatories’ core national security interests and so costly that many 
countries will be hesitant to accept it” (my italics).62  
Concern about intrusiveness and the possible loss of sensitive information was not a 
new observation to arms control analysts. When interviewing an anonymous United 
States arms control official a year and a half before, Wade Boese of Arms Control 
Today heard him say that “We will not let the IAEA tail wag the U.S. navy dog”. 
Implicitly; the United States would retain its right to produce HEU fuel for its nuclear 
submarines without risk of intrusion by international inspectors. In addition, three 
years prior to the decision on the FMCT, the U.S. rejected a verification protocol for 
the Biological Weapons Convention: On 25 July 2001, U.S. Ambassador Donald 
Mahley (2001) declared that his country could not support the draft text for a 
                                              
62 The statement is available at: http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/?c=FissBan 
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protocol, partly because it would pose “unacceptable risks to proprietary or national 
security related information”. As a result, the negotiations collapsed.63 
During the review process, neo-conservatives in the Bush administration took the 
position that it would be very difficult or indeed impossible to establish an effective 
inspection system for an FMCT because verification would require extremely 
intrusive inspections, such as sampling in and around facilities – which the 
Department of Defence would not allow.64 Apparently, this position has now been 
accepted by the rest of the administration, and leading it to conclude that the potential 
costs of international inspections (in terms of loss of national security-related 
information) would be unacceptably high. 
In comparison with the former administration this is also new. Admittedly, the 
Clinton administration acknowledged that the FMCT should have a verification 
regime that was “tailored to reflect the uniqueness of this treaty” (Holum 1999). It 
would not be comprehensive like the verification arrangements applied in Non-
Nuclear-Weapon States under the NPT, but rather be focused on detecting any illegal 
production that might take place after the cut-off date. It would have managed access 
provisions to ensure that sensitive information was not compromised by international 
inspections.65 All things considered, the Clinton administration believed that eventual 
concerns about intrusiveness could be accommodated. The Bush administration 
believed they could not. 
                                              
63 According to Barbara Hatch Rosenberg (2001), such U.S. concerns about intrusiveness were exaggerated since the 
protocol would only provide for seven on-site inspections a year, each of which would require U.S. approval beforehand. 
Inspectors’ access to the facilities could be further limited by applying managed access provision. Furthermore, at the time 
of negotiations, many of the relevant facilities were already being verified under the Chemical Weapons Convention, of 
which the U.S. had been a member since 1997. The concerns of the bio-industry about loss of proprietary information had 
already been accommodated in the draft text, but the Bush administration used it as an excuse against a verification 
protocol it did not really want, according to Rosenberg. 
64 Personal email communication with a former U.S. official. Name withheld on request. 
65 Managed access provisions allow member states to undertake specific measures in order to hide and protect sensitive 
information which is not relevant to the treaty. Such measures could involve screening off certain areas, facilities or 
equipment which are not relevant, or turning off special computers, etc. 
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As for the U.S. contribution to a FMCT verification agency, it is not known what 
figures the reviewers have calculated with. Independent analysts have suggested that 
if the IAEA were given the task, it would require a doubling or perhaps tripling of its 
current verification budget (du Preez 2005).66 The United States would most likely 
have to cover a substantial part of this increase, so a concern about costs would not be 
unwarranted. 
Furthermore, the costs of establishing and running a FMCT verification agency 
would add to current expenses of financing the unilateral verification sources 
(NTMs): No less than 15 intelligence agencies collect and analyse national security-
related information worldwide. Under the U.S. State Department, a “Bureau for 
Verification, Compliance and Implementation” is instructed to verify other states’ 
compliance with arms control agreements. It is the policy of this bureau that National 
Means and Methods of verification (NMM)67 are a “critical part of every approach to 
verification” (Desutter 2004). The head of the bureau, Assistant Secretary Paula 
Desutter, has repeatedly argued that too many states put too much faith in the ability 
of international organisations to verify compliance, rather than trusting their own 
NMM: “It is a common misperception that a combination or international data 
declarations, international cooperative measures (including international technical 
measures) and on-site inspection regimes all by themselves will be sufficient for 
detecting non-compliance” (Desutter 2004). While “useful tools” for investigating 
indications of non-compliance, they will always be limited to the agreement on 
access and collection capabilities reached by the states parties during negotiations. 
They will also be limited to the locations where they are employed, the argument 
goes (ibid.). 
                                              
66 Currently (2005), the IAEA has a safeguards budget of $ 89 millions. The costs of FMCT verification has been estimated 
in the range of $ 40 – 140 millions, depending on the scope of verification, cf. chapter 2.5.1 (Schaper 1999) 
67 According to the Bureau of Verification and Compliance the term “National Means and Methods” (NTMs) is more 
suitable than “National Technical Means” (NTMs) as it entails not only information obtained from technical sources but 
from whatever sources (Desutter 2004). 
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According to Executive Director Daryl Kimball (2004) of the Arms Control 
Association, this is “another symptom of the Bush team’s ideological opposition to 
multilateral arms control.” It might also signal an effort to save costs. Either way, this 
is a new U.S. position not held by the former administration. 
Interestingly, the press guidance of 29 July 2004 contained a third argument against 
verification, suggesting that even if the concerns about intrusiveness and costs were 
met, the FMCT would not be effectively verifiable anyway: “Even with extensive 
verification measures, we will not have high confidence in our ability to monitor 
compliance with an FMCT”. The new position ran counter to earlier United States 
positions68 and basically rejected the Shannon mandate. The press guidance also 
announced that a team of U.S. experts would give a briefing in Geneva on why the 
United States did not believe verification could be effective. Although speaking 
positively about the briefings afterwards, the experts reportedly made scant headway 
in convincing foreign diplomats (Boese 2004a).69 True, there were technical 
arguments about the difficulty of verifying whether a specific quantity of fissile 
material had been produced before or after the treaty took effect (The experts argued 
that since the treaty would allow Nuclear-Weapon States to keep their stockpiles, this 
material could easily be confused with newly produced, illegal material) and about 
detecting clandestine enrichment facilities, but these did not appear very convincing 
to the audience. Over the past years, the CD diplomats have learned all too well that 
although FMCT verification would be difficult, it could be done.  
For those present at the BWC negotiations it must have been somewhat of a déjà vu, 
because almost exactly three years earlier the Bush administration had come to the 
same conclusion on the BWC verification protocol. After six months of review, U.S. 
                                              
68 For instance, at the Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference on 11–12 January 1999, Clinton’s Special 
Negotiator for Fissile Material and Senior Cutoff Coordinator ,Michael Guhin, stated: “We think a strong regime of routine 
monitoring of all production facilities and all newly produced material and a regime for non-routine or so-called challenge 
inspections would give us enough building blocks to build an effective verification regime” Mike Guhin’s remarks are 
available at: http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/guhin.htm 
69 Personal communication with Norwegian diplomats. 
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Ambassador Donald Mahley (2001) declared that it was a “futile effort” as it would 
“not enhance our confidence in compliance and will do little to deter those countries 
seeking to develop biological weapons.” According to Rosenberg (2001), the U.S. 
position was “disingenuous”.70  
What does it take for an international agreement to be “effectively verifiable”? Two 
statements by top officials of the Bureau for Verification and Compliance give an 
indication: 
The U.S. considers an arrangement or treaty to be effectively verifiable if the degree of 
verifiability is judged sufficient given the compliance history of the parties involved, the risks 
associated with non-compliance, the difficulty of response to deny violators the benefits of 
their violations, the language and measures incorporated into the agreement and our own 
National Means and Methods of verification” (Desutter 2004).  
Moreover, “[t]he precise contours of what it means to be verifiable will vary 
according to context”, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Chris 
Ford told Arms Control Today on 7 February 2005 (Boese 2005a).  
How the “context” might vary was explained by Ike Reed, Deputy Permanent 
Representative at the U.S. Delegation in Geneva:71 The U.S. does not believe it is 
necessary to verify that Russia, a friendly state, adheres to its commitments under the 
Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT)72 because it is not likely to cheat. But 
there are other agreements that in principle would require verification but that are not 
effectively verifiable because they include countries which would not be deterred 
                                              
70 Rosenberg (2001) argues that throughout negotiations the US had persistently insisted on loopholes to limit the 
declaration of bio-defence facilities, opposing the declaration of all production plants other than vaccine plants. They were 
also responsible for provisions that would have prohibited sampling during visits, and that would have substituted host-state 
access control with more stringent managed access. Rosenberg also saysthat it was Ambassador Donald Mahley who 
proposed and directed the review, and who negotiators in Geneva considered to be an opponent of the protocol. 
71 Interview with Ike Reed, May 2004. It should be noted that Mr. Reed had to speak in general terms about verification 
and compliance since the FMCT was under review by the United States government. 
72 Under SORT, which was concluded in May 2002, the governments of the United States and Russia are obliged to reduce 
the number of strategic nuclear warheads which are deployed to 1700 and 2200 apiece. However, since SORT requires only 
removal of the warheads (not actual destruction) and has no verification mechanism, it is not a true disarmament treaty. 
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from cheating despite a strong verification system. Thus, the verification effort would 
be futile – and costly.  
Revealing a fundamental disbelief in the capacity of international regimes to 
manipulate the incentive structures of its members, this view may also explain why 
the U.S. does not think the FMCT can be made effectively verifiable: Potential 
violators will not be deterred by detection no matter how timely it may be, and no 
matter what the consequences. This brings us to the next issue at hand: what of the 
concerns about the costs of enforcement? 
4.3.3 Concerns about the costs of enforcement? 
Again, there are two kinds of enforcement costs: hard consequences that are inflicted 
upon oneself, and hard consequences that have to be inflicted upon others in order to 
deter and punish non-compliance. With regard to the former, being awash with fissile 
material, the United States would not seem to have any incentives for violating the 
treaty, and would therefore not expect hard consequences. With regard to the latter, 
there seems more reason for concern, considering past U.S. experience with the NPT 
and some future scenarios with the FMCT.  
Top officials in the Bureau for Verification and Compliance often refer to Fred 
Charles Iklè’s classic article from 1961, “After Detection – What?”73 “What really 
counts is to ensure that there are sufficient consequences to a violation once it has 
been detected”, Paula Desutter (2004) declared to the UN General Assembly’s First 
Committee on 22 October 2004. Furthermore, she argued, “If arms control, non-
proliferation and disarmament agreements and commitments are to support the 
security of all nations, then all nations must respond when confronted with non-
                                              
73 Fred Charles Iklè (1961: 208), a former head of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, made the 
point that “(…) detecting violations is not enough. What counts are the political and military consequences of a violation 
once it has been detected, since these alone will determine whether or not the violator stands to gain in the end. In entering 
into an arms control agreement, we must know that we are not only technically capable of detecting a violation but that also 
we or the rest of the world we be politically, legally or militarily in a position to react effectively if a violation is 
discovered”. 
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compliance. Unilateral U.S. action to encourage compliance is not enough” (my 
italics). Her deputy Chris Ford (2004) has argued that, although the United States 
does possess some countermeasures (e.g. targeted export control, trade and other 
economic measures, or missile defences), these are of limited value when the 
countervailing measures needed to enforce compliance and deter non-compliance are 
mostly multilateral ones. In his speech Ford made specific reference to the cases of 
Iran and North Korea, with which the United States is particularly displeased.74 The 
Bush administration appears to have little faith in the willingness of members of the 
IAEA Board and the Security Council to use hard consequences against violators of 
the NPT, and has signalled that it is fed up with carrying the costs of enforcement by 
itself. 
The costs of enforcement may very well be of concern with regard to the FMCT as 
well. If another member, e.g. Pakistan, were to violate the FMCT, a substantial 
amount of pressure would have to be mounted to try to deny the country the benefits 
of its violation. The United States might have to supply India with conventional 
weapons in order to uphold the balance of threat between the two countries without 
restarting production. (If India were to commence producing as well, it is likely that 
the treaty would fall apart.) China might have to get some “compensation” as well, as 
a result of the Indian rearmament. Admittedly, this is a hypothetical scenario, but it 
shows what difficulties the United States and others might encounter in trying to 
enforce an FMCT encompassing all the eight Nuclear-Weapon States. It points up the 
difficulty of applying moderate sanctions that will not lead to a breakout by another 
state party, in this case China. 
 
                                              
74 The United States believes that Iran has violated its safeguards agreements and is in non-compliance with Article III and 
perhaps Article II of the NPT. It further holds that the matter should be referred to the Security Council, but so far the 
IAEA Board of Governors has not been willing to do so. Currently (September 2005) Iran is still under IAEA investigation. 
The case of North Korea was referred to the Security Council early in 2003, but the Council has so far failed to take any 
significant action. The reason for the impasse, and for the frustration of the United States, is the Chinese sheltering of North 
Korea. There are six-party talks underway to try to resolve the issue of the North Korean nuclear weapons programme. 
 60 
4.3.4 Concerns about participation? 
As argued by Downs et al. (1996: 399), the number of instances of non-compliance 
(and hence, the costs of verification and enforcement) might be reduced by limiting 
membership of the treaty to those states which can comply under normal 
circumstances. However, while non-compliance is a concern of the United States, it 
does not appear that restricting FMCT membership would be a viable option. 
Integrating the de facto Nuclear Weapons states – India, Pakistan and Israel – has 
“always” (at least since the Clinton administration) been the main rationale 
underlying the FMCT; without them, the United States would probably see little to be 
gained by negotiating it. Further, the United States would be highly unlikely to agree 
to a legal ban on its own nuclear weapons material production if its old adversaries, 
China and Russia, did not follow suit .  
We will take a moment to review these points below: Do India, Pakistan, Israel, 
China and Russia seem ready to negotiate an FMCT? If not, how does this affect the 
U.S. decision? 
India and Pakistan 
India and Pakistan are still producing fissile material for their nuclear weapons 
programmes, and Washington has been forging new ties with these countries in an 
effort to adapt to the new post-Cold War security environment. After 9/11, Pakistan 
has become an important ally in the battle against terrorists, and the United States 
recently agreed to supply it with F16 fighter jets, once again waiving important 
amendments to its weapons export control act.75  
                                              
75 The 1976 Symington amendment stipulates that any Non-Nuclear Weapon State importing or exporting unsafeguarded 
enrichment materials, equipment, or technology would be prohibited from receiving U.S. economic or military assistance 
under the Foreign Assistance Act or the Arms Export Control Act. Pakistan’s importation of unsafeguarded nuclear 
materials and equipment for its Kahuta enrichment facility triggered the immediate cutoff of U.S. assistance in 1976. 
However, according to Weiss (2005), the United States soon turned a “blind eye” to violations of the Symington 
amendment and other amendments when Pakistan became an important ally against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan during 
most of the 1980s, and, again, in the battle against terrorism after 9/11. For three decades now, cooperation with Pakistan to 
accomplish other strategic goals has been deemed more important than non-proliferation goals, according to Weiss. 
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India is considered of perhaps even greater importance, at least judging by the recent 
steps taken under the new strategic partnership. Under the “New Steps in the 
Strategic Partnership (NSSP), the United States is committed to a liberalization of its 
weapons export policies towards India and is willing to supply advanced weapons 
systems – including F16 or F18 fighter jets, command and control systems, early 
warning systems and missile defence systems. It is also committed to holding a series 
of high-level dialogues on various contentious issues of strategic, energy-policy and 
economic interest. The energy dialogue has already made concrete results, as the 
United States has agreed to take the steps necessary to remove U.S. and international 
barriers to peaceful nuclear cooperation with India –another major turning point in 
U.S. policy,76 and of great concern to Pakistan.77 
The Bush administration evidently sees a significant strategic interest in maintaining 
good bilateral relations with both India and Pakistan. According to Jean du Preez 
(2005), U.S. policy has shifted from trying to prevent proliferation to India and 
Pakistan to prevention of proliferation from India and Pakistan to rogue states and 
terrorist groups, and the FMCT is not relevant for this purpose.78 
Israel 
The case of Israel is difficult because this country has always been ambiguous about 
its nuclear weapons programme, not admitting that it has nuclear weapons, but not 
denying this either. Assumedly, under the right conditions, Israel could agree to an 
                                              
76 The fuel supply agreement is significant because the Tarapur reactor was originally delivered and built with U.S. 
assistance. In 1974, when the United States discovered that India had achieved nuclear weapon capability, it imposed a ban 
on all nuclear cooperation. The fuel supply arrangement for Tarapur was suspended even though the reactor was not linked 
to the military programme and was under safeguards of the IAEA. On 17 July 2005 President Bush declared that nuclear 
trade would be reopened and fuel supply for Tarapur “expeditiously considered” (Boese 2005c). 
77 Pakistan is now the only Nuclear-Weapon State not to have received some recognition by the United States, according to 
one Pakistani analyst (Hussain 2005). Pakistani authorities are “terrified” by the deepened strategic partnership between the 
United States and India, according to Maria Sultan at Bradford University. – Personal communication with Maria Sultan, 
2005.  
78 The last sentence is arguable since the more fissile material a country produces, the greater are the chances, at least from 
a purely statistical point of view, that some of it will be diverted to rogue states or terrorists. I owe this point to Fred 
McGoldrick. 
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FMCT because it probably has already produced enough fissile material for its 
national security needs. However, this would have to be an agreement that did not 
address any past production (stocks) in order to for the Israelis to retain the doctrine 
of nuclear ambiguity, and it would be in the context of peace negotiations in the 
Middle East. At the moment, Israel does not seem ready to bring up the nuclear issue, 
and the Bush administration will certainly not put any pressure to bear. 
China 
China has repeatedly expressed concerns about U.S. intentions to build a missile 
defence system79 and might feel compelled to increase its deterrent capacity by 
producing more missiles (and fissile material). 
For China, the U.S. decision to develop missile defence systems is of great concern, 
and mainly for three reasons: First, it further reinforces the Chinese perception that 
Washington is seeking absolute security at the expense of others, and at the expense 
of international strategic stability.80 Second, it would reduce the deterrent capability 
of the Chinese nuclear arsenal: China possesses only some 20 Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) capable of reaching the United States and thus having a 
deterrent effect (Yuan 2003: 75). This would clearly be insufficient against the kind 
of advanced missile defence systems which the United States is planning. Third, 
missile defence systems will be deployed not only on U.S. territory but also abroad to 
protect U.S. forces and allied states.  “Theatre Missile Defence systems” (TMD) are 
likely to be deployed in Japan, India and perhaps Taiwan. The latter is of particular 
                                              
79Even before taking office, G.W. Bush pledged that his administration would develop missile defence capabilities in order 
to protect the United States against missile threats. In May 2001, President Bush announced the administration’s decision to 
deploy a ballistic missile defence. In December 2001, he announced the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty (ABM), the sole international treaty banning missile defences. By June 2002, the ABM had become history (Yuan 
2003: 76) 
80 Sha Zukang, a former Director General of Arms Control and Disarmament in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has stated 
that “what it [the United States] wants is absolute security, because it is only from a position of absolute security that it can 
enjoy complete freedom of action in dealing with other countries. The U.S. Government and Congress have found in NMD 
[National Missile Defence] the best means to deliver this.” Quoted by Yuan (2003:80) 
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concern for China because in recent years the United States has shown signs of 
deviating from its “One China” principle (that Taiwan belongs to and will be reunited 
with China) by strengthening diplomatic ties with Taiwan, selling arms and 
suggesting that defence cooperation between the two countries should be 
strengthened even further (Yuan 2003: 84). China fears that all this, especially if 
followed by missile defence deployment on Taiwan, may boost demands for 
independence on the island, leading to instability across the Taiwan Strait and 
perhaps throughout the region.81   
While Chinese diplomats in recent years have become more moderate in their 
criticism of the U.S. decision, Chinese leaders have also made it clear that they will 
not return to a situation where they are vulnerable to U.S. nuclear blackmail  (Yuan 
2003: 88).82 A likely response would be a significant increase in the Chinese ICBM 
and MRBM (Medium-Range Ballistic Missile) forces, which would require 
production of more fissile material. U.S. intelligence predicts that, with the addition 
of these new strategic ballistic missiles, China’s arsenal of some 20 ballistic missiles 
capable of targeting North America could expand fivefold. The United States deploys 
several thousand strategic nuclear weapons capable of striking China. 
Thus, China has little to gain from negotiating an FMCT at the moment. That is why 
it has been holding it hostage for a treaty Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space 
(PAROS), as the United States is well aware. The United States also knows that the 
recent steps towards a U.S.–Indo strategic partnership might be seen as provocative 
to Beijing, further reducing the chances of FMCT negotiations. 
                                              
81 Chinese Ambassador Sha has stated that “China’s opposition to U.S. transfer of TMD [Theater Missile Defence] to 
Taiwan is also based on … its adverse impact on China’s reunification. TMD in Taiwan will give the pro-independence 
forces in Taiwan a false sense of security, which may incite them to reckless moves. This can only lead to instability across 
the Taiwan Strait or even in the entire North-East Asian region.” Quoted by Yuan 2003: 85 
82 Cf. the U.S.–Chinese conflict over the Pacific islands Quemoy and Matsu in the 1950s, which spurred the Chinese 
nuclear weapons programme. Chairman Mao stated afterwards: “If we are not to be bullied with in the present-day world, 
we cannot do without the bomb. See Chapter 2.2.7 
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Russia 
Initially, Russia was also highly critical to the U.S. decision to develop missile 
defences, but this criticism has faded. According to Yuan (2003: 79) this is because 
Russia acknowledged that missile defences would not significantly reduce its 
deterrent capacity in the foreseeable future, since the country would still possess an 
overwhelming number of missiles under the Moscow Treaty.83 The Russians also 
acknowledged that there was little they could do to prevent the U.S. decision and that 
they had more to gain from cooperation with the United States under a strategic 
relationship. The United States knows this, and from this point of view Russia should 
not have any problems with acceding to an FMCT, especially since they also possess 
more than enough fissile material. However, the United States also knows that 
verification might be a particular challenge for Russia, since Russian enrichment and 
reprocessing facilities were not physically designed for verification.84  
To summarize: reduced participation in an FMCT is not an option for the United 
States. It knows that it cannot pressure India, Pakistan or Israel into joining the 
FMCT, and that it is better to work with these countries to secure other strategic 
interests in the regions. It also believes that China will not agree to FMCT 
negotiations without getting some concessions by the United States, which it is not 
willing to give. All in all, negotiating the FMCT is for many reasons a not very 
favourable option to the United States. As one analyst put it; “It is simply too much 
hassle and too little gain for the United States to really bother. Besides, the Bush 
administration does not really believe in arms control, so why should it try to 
convince other states otherwise?”85 
                                              
83 Under the Moscow Treaty (or SORT) of 2002 Russia is obliged to reduce the number of its strategic nuclear warheads to 
2,200 by the end of 2012. 
84 Personal email communication with Fred McGoldrick. 
85 Personal communication with Daryl Kimball, 2004 
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4.4 Summary 
In this chapter I have analysed U.S. policy on the FMCT using a pattern of reasons 
that a state may have for avoiding a deep agreement. To some degree this pattern has 
coincided with the empirical material examined: First, the United States does appear 
to be concerned about other states’ compliance, and it is concerned about the costs of 
verifying these states. Further, it does not believe that verification will deter non-
compliance, only that it will be very costly for its contributors. Enforcement is likely 
to be very difficult given the incentives involved and the difficulty of applying 
moderate sanctions. With regard to its own ability to comply, the United States does 
not seem to have any reason for concern. However, it is worried about intrusive 
verification. 
Thus, clearly there is some support to the hypothesis of Downs et al. However, as 
pointed out in the previous section, the main reason why the United States is 
currently reluctant to FMCT negotiations is the unlikelihood that all the target states 
would participate fully. The United States has good reason to believe that India, 
Pakistan, Israel and, perhaps, China are not ready to end production of fissile material 
for weapons purposes, and it has little to gain from pressing for an FMCT. 
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5. Pakistan 
5.1 Introduction 
Again, using the pattern outlined in Chapter Three we shall examine whether there is 
support for our hypothesis when applied to the case of Pakistani policy.  
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 will briefly outline the historical 
production of fissile material for military purposes in Pakistan – to give the reader 
some more background on the issue. Section 5.3 will analyse the Pakistani FMCT 
policy of today.  
5.2 Historical production of fissile material for military 
purposes86  
The nuclear programme of Pakistan began as a peaceful effort in the mid-1950s, later 
complemented by a military programme in the early 1970s (Toft 2004). The Pakistan 
Atomic Energy Commission was established in 1956, and in the following years 
more than 600 Pakistani researchers travelled to the United States, Canada and West 
European countries for training under the Atoms for Peace programme. Only a few 
nuclear laboratories were in place in the mid-1960s. The first research reactor Parr-1 
(Pakistan Atomic Research Reactor) was delivered by the United States and began 
operating in 1965. The first commercial power reactor KANUPP (Karachi Nuclear 
Power Plant) was delivered by Canada and began operating in 1971. Both these 
reactors were immediately put under IAEA safeguards and could not be used in the 
clandestine military programme which was soon to get underway. 
                                              
86 Two written sources of information have been particularly important for this brief historic account of the Pakistani 
nuclear weapons programme: Toft 2004 and Sublette 2002. 
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Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme began in 1972. Since the second war with 
India in 1965, various political groups had demanded that Pakistan should develop its 
own nuclear weapons programme. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then foreign minister, argued 
that “if India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we 
will get one of our own. We have no other choice”.87 A less direct statement was 
made in an editorial by the leader of the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission:  
The recent war, inflicted by India on us, has shown once again, that even the best intentions 
can lead one to the battle field. Every community has the duty, in the interest of its own 
survival, to contribute its share to the defence efforts. We as scientists shoulder a rather 
special responsibility: we have accepted the challenge of atomic energy and we must now try 
to prove ourselves equal to the task, be it peace or war.88  
After the third and last war between India and Pakistan in 1971, Bhutto became prime 
minister. In 1972, a secret meeting was held with nuclear scientists about the 
development of a nuclear weapons programme, and a clandestine programme was 
started shortly after. The motivation was to prevent India from splitting Pakistan up 
further.89 Pakistan’s first success with developing weapons material was with highly 
enriched uranium. The plutonium way proved more difficult due to international 
interference, but was also successful in the end. 
5.2.1 HEU production 
From the mid-1970s, Pakistan established a network in the West with an aim of 
acquiring enrichment technology and components, as well as the equipment to make 
its own enrichment centrifuges (Albright 1997: 272, Toft 2004: 15ff)). The point of 
departure was that a skilled nuclear engineer, Abdul Quadeer Kahn, had managed to 
                                              
87 Quoted in Sublette 2002: 1 
88 Editorial in The Nucleus, the official quarterly journal of the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission, quoted in Mian 
1998. 
89 Pakistan accused India of having intervened in the civil war and contributed to the splitting of the country into West 
Pakistan and East Pakistan (today’s Bangladesh). 
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steal drawings for centrifuge designs from a European enrichment consortium, 
URENCO, where he was a consultant. It is also widely believed that Kahn managed 
to use URENCO’s contacts to establish a network of suppliers of nuclear technology 
and material. The drawings showed designs of early-generation German centrifuges 
(G-1 and G-2) and some prototypes of newer Dutch models (SNOR and CNOR). 
Pakistan had success only with the German models, which would later constitute the 
core of the Pakistani nuclear enrichment complex. Three enrichment facilities were 
built in the mid-1970s: two pilot plants in Sihala and Golra Sharif near Islamabad, 
and a main plant at Kahuta. Pakistan first declared that it could produce LEU in 1984. 
The production of HEU is assumed to have started two years later, continuing 
uninterruptedly until 1989.90 It is said to have been resumed between 1990–1991 as a 
result of heightened tensions between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. In mid-1991 
production of HEU was suspended, although it is not certain for how long.91 
To summarize, the Pakistan enrichment complex consists of four enrichment plants, 
the most important of which is located at Kahuta.92 Pakistan also has uranium mines 
and facilities for uranium processing.  
Today’s stockpile of weapons-grade uranium can only be estimated, since we do not 
know the exact number of centrifuges or the material flow or whether (some of) the 
centrifuges have been modernized, or for how long the moratorium on HEU 
production actually lasted.93 I will not attempt to make an estimate here; however, a 
                                              
90 Former prime minister Benazir Bhutto is believed to have demanded a halt in the production of weapon uranium prior to 
her visit to Washington in June 1989, which the United States was able to verify beforehand (Albright 1997: 274) 
91 A Q Kahn has on the other hand stated that the production of weapons uranium went on under all regimes. Either way it 
does not matter. Albright et al. (1997: 278) have argued that even if HEU production was suspended, the effect on weapons 
material production does not have to be large. Pakistan continued to produce a large amount LEU for the whole period, 
which can be further enriched to weapons-grade uranium in approximately six months.  
92 According to some sources, the fourth enrichment facility shall have been built near the city of Wah, possibly with 
Chinese assistance. The capacity has been assessed as large scale by some sources, but this is highly uncertain. For this 
reason most analysts consider only production at the Kahuta plant when they estimate the production of highly enrichment 
uranium in Pakistan. 
93 As already noted, the length of the HEU production moratorium does not need to have a significant effect on weapons 
uranium production, since LEU production went on continuously the whole period.  
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study by Heidi Toft (2004) showing how much weapons-grade uranium Pakistan 
could have produced from 1986 until the end of 2004, indicates between 990 and 
1,700 kg.94 This amount corresponds to a total of 50–85 weapons equivalents and a 
weapons stockpile which could grow by four to seven weapons a year.95 
5.2.2 Plutonium production 
Pakistan’s plutonium programme began in the early 1970s with initial efforts to 
acquire a reprocessing plant (Toft 2004: 14). The reason it needed an reprocessing 
plant, Islamabad argued, was for MOX-fuel96 production to its power reactor 
KANUPP. A delivery agreement was made between Pakistan and a French firm, and 
approved by the IAEA in 1976. The building of the Chasma reprocessing facility 
commenced shortly after. However, the French became concerned about Pakistan’s 
intentions, and suggested a moderation of the construction so that it would still yield 
a mixture of uranium and plutonium, but which could not be used directly in a 
nuclear weapon. Pakistan rejected this proposal, and the French withdrew from the 
agreement after U.S. pressure in 1978. Pakistan is believed to have proceeded with 
the development of the facility in the ensuing years, albeit with little success. As a 
result of this incident, IAEA safeguards on the KANUPP reactor were also 
strengthened. According to Albright (1998), Pakistan’s intention was most likely to 
secretly withdraw spent fuel from the KANUPP reactor to produce weapons 
plutonium in the Chasma facility. This has of course not been confirmed by Pakistani 
authorities.  
Pakistan did succeed in building a small-scale reprocessing pilot plant: New Labs at 
the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH) in 
                                              
94 Toft’s estimate is based on Albright 1997 
95 As Toft (2004: 34ff) notes, this amount may be underestimated since it is based only on centrifuges operating at Kahuta; 
the other smaller enrichment plants are excluded. Furthermore, the number of centrifuges at Kahuta may very well be 
larger than 3000, which is the figure provided by interviews of some U.S. officials back in 1991. 
96 MOX, Mixed Oxide Fuel, is a mixture of uranium oxide and plutonium oxide which can be used as fuel in certain 
reactors. 
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Rawalpindi was finished in the early 1980s. Also this plant was built through French 
assistance, which was interrupted after U.S. pressure in 1983. However, since 
Pakistan had no unsafeguarded spent fuel to reprocess, the plant remained unused 
until 1998.  
The building of the Khushab reactor commenced sometime in the mid-1980s, 
probably with secret Chinese assistance (although Pakistani authorities deny this). It 
was finished in 1996, but not started up until two years later, in April 1998. By then a 
heavy-water plant had been built nearby, to supply the reactor.97 The Khushab reactor 
is well suited for the production of weapons plutonium because it allows for fuel 
change without shutting down the reactor.98  
By the late 1990s, it was known that Pakistan possessed all the necessary facilities for 
a weapons plutonium programme: An unsafeguarded nuclear reactor and a heavy-
water plant in Khushab, and a reprocessing facility in Rawalpindi. The status of the 
Chasma facility was uncertain, and it still is (2005).  
Although they are not a part of the weapons programme it should be noted that 
Pakistan also has two commercial power reactors, KANUPP (Karachi Nuclear Power 
Plant, also called the Karachi reactor) and CHASNUPP-1 (Chasma Nuclear Power 
Plant, also called Chasma-1), of which the first would be well suited for the 
production of weapons plutonium while the latter would not.99 However, since they 
are both under IAEA safeguards, this is very unlikely to happen anyway. Pakistan 
also has two research reactors, PARR-1 and PARR-2 (Pakistan Atomic Research 
Reactor 1 and 2), both of which are located at PINSTECH and submitted to IAEA 
safeguards. 
                                              
97 The Khushab heavy-water plant was discovered by satellite in 2000. Pakistan has two other plants in Multan and Karachi 
which supply the KANUPP reactor with heavy water.  
98 The production of weapons plutonium requires a rapid change of fuel to avoid Pu-240 build-up. Pu-240 is an unwanted 
bi-product of the irradiation process because it slows down the fission reaction. 
99 KANUPP is a heavy-water reactor, which makes it suitable for weapons plutonium production. CHASNUPP-1 is a light-
water reactor, which makes it less suitable. 
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In reality the Khushab reactor is the only relevant factor in determining how much 
weapons plutonium Pakistan may have produced since it went critical in 1998. Toft 
(2004: 38) has estimated that by the end of 2004 it had produced between 40 and 80 
kg of weapons-grade plutonium, enough for 7 or 13 weapons equivalents. The annual 
increase of the weapon stockpile would be enough for 1.4 – 2.2 nuclear weapons. 
5.3 Pakistan’s policy on the FMCT 
After the CD had finally managed to establish a programme of work in its third and 
final session in August 1998, Pakistan’s ambassador, Mr Munir Akram (1998), 
declared that he was “happy” about the CD’s accomplishment. In his statement 
Ambassador Akram emphasized that an FMT100 was one of the long-standing goals 
of the international community, together with the establishment of nuclear weapon-
free zones and a time-limited framework for nuclear disarmament. The reason for the 
delay was the unwillingness of some states [the acknowledged Nuclear-Weapon 
States and India] to see these treaties together in context. Another obstacle, he argued, 
was the declared policy of some states [again, the acknowledged Nuclear-Weapon 
States and India] that the FMT should be only a non-proliferation measure, while 
Pakistan and a large majority of CD members thought that an “FMT must address the 
issue of stockpiles of fissile material possessed by some states and, through their 
progressive and balanced reductions, to promote the goal of nuclear disarmament. 
The treaty should not be, once again, a measure for nuclear non-proliferation alone”. 
For Pakistan it was critical that the issue of stocks should be part of the negotiations 
in order for it to assess both the arsenals and stockpiles of India, and to calculate the 
necessary countermeasures. 
This is also the official position of Pakistan today. According to Syed Shaukat Hasan, 
a minister at the Pakistani delegation to the CD in Geneva, “Pakistan has to know 
                                              
100 Since the treaty should not only cut off future production but also lead to reductions in existing stockpiles, Pakistan has 
always referred to it as the “Fissile Material Treaty” or “FMT”. 
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how much India has”, and Pakistan would not agree to negotiate a treaty that did not 
address stocks even if the majority of CD members wanted it.101  
India’s nuclear weapons programme has always been the foremost motivating factor 
behind Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme. Pakistani officials make no secret of 
this. On the contrary, they always emphasize that India went nuclear first, and that 
Pakistan was forced to respond equally for the sake of its own national security. “Our 
pursuit was security driven, not status driven” [as opposed to India’s], Ambassador 
Masood Kahn (2005) explained to the CD on 24 March 2005. Ambassador Shahbaz 
further explained that “it is not the United States or Russian or Chinese nuclear 
programmes which are of concern to Pakistan. It is India’s, because of the 
unfortunate history of our two countries, and because the Indian nuclear programme 
is bigger and more advanced.” He said that India got a head start because it had 
begun developing nuclear weapons right after de-colonization. Pakistan did not begin 
until 1974 [sic],102 when the Indians performed their so-called peaceful nuclear 
explosion.103 
It seems clear that Pakistan will not agree to negotiations of an FMCT or FMT until it 
has produced the necessary amount of fissile material for what is perceived as a 
“minimum deterrence capability” vis-à-vis India. According to Talat Masood, a 
former adviser of President Musharraf, this means enough material for around 200 or 
300 nuclear warheads,104 which may take somewhere between 11 and 28 years to 
produce according to Toft’s (2004) estimates.105 Until then, Pakistan’s interest in the 
                                              
101 Interview with Syed Shaukat Hasan, Geneva, May 2004 
102 We know that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme had in fact been initiated a few years before the India test 
explosion – in 1972. 
103 Interview with Ambassador Shahbaz, Oslo, 3 August 2005 
104 Personal email communication with Lt Gen. Talat Masood, 2004 
105 Toft (2004) estimates the annual increase of weapon equivalents as somewhere between 5.4 and 9.2.  If Pakistan already 
has enough material for 50 or 100 weapon equivalents remaining production is 150 or 100 in order to reach 200. Divided 
on the annual production rate of 5.4 or 9.2 it may take a minimum of 11 years and a maximum of 28 years to produce 
enough material for 200 warheads.  
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agreement will remain “nominal”, so Masood. In the interview ambassador Shahbaz 
also signalled that his government was “comfortable” that the FMCT negotiations 
were not to start immediately, as his country was still producing. 
For this reason it seems clear that an FMCT does not top Pakistan’s agenda today. 
More important is how to reduce India’s supremacy in the region, and one way for 
Pakistan to do this is obviously to increase its nuclear assets by producing more 
fissile material. That said, when, or if, a balance is obtained and Pakistan considers 
joining, it will most certainly follow India’s compliance with intense scrutiny (and 
vice versa), and the variables above might very well be crucial to its decision about 
accession.  
We will proceed with the analysis below: to what extent might concerns about non-
compliance, the costs of verification and enforcement and participation have an 
impact in a future decision about the FMCT? 
5.3.1 Concerns about non-compliance? 
Pakistan has an unfortunate experience with India’s willingness to honour its 
agreements, Ambassador Shahbaz explained:106 In 1992 when the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC) was concluded, India and Pakistan also concluded a bilateral 
agreement saying that neither of the two countries should develop, produce or use 
chemical weapons. However, when the CWC entered into force in 1997, India 
declared that it had continued to produce chemical weapon right up to this date. This 
was a clear violation of the intentions of the bilateral agreement, said Shahbaz. 
Unlike the CWC, the bilateral agreement was a mere declaratory agreement with no 
verification provisions attached. Pakistan would not make this mistake again, but 
would demand that the FMCT be made effectively verifiable. 
                                              
106 Interview with Ambassador Shahbaz, Oslo, 3 August 2005 
 74 
With regard to its own ability to comply, the government has not expressed any such 
concerns, according to Assistant Professor Zafar Nawaz Jaspal at the Quaid-I-Azam 
University in Islamabad.107 Some segments of society did express such concerns, 
although it is not certain how much influence they might have on the government. 
5.3.2 Concerns about the costs of verification? 
Here we recall that there are two kinds of verification costs – those of being verified 
(potential loss of sensitive information) and those of verifying others (contributions to 
the verification system). We shall examine both in the following. 
“It is an independent nation. Nobody comes inside and checks our things. We check 
them ourselves”, President Musharraf declared on 4 February 2004.108 The statement 
was in response to an enquiry about letting international investigators question some 
of the nuclear scientists who had been connected to the A. Q. Kahn network. Some 
analysts have suggested that this might indicate a general aversion to verification 
among Pakistani government officials, and that they in reality would prefer the least 
possible amount of verification under the FMCT.109  
Others maintain that, in order to understand the statement, one must also know the 
right background. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal110for instance has argued that there were 
special circumstances which spurred the statement by President Musharraf: The 
Pakistani government felt that it had been cooperating with the international 
community in exposing and eliminating the Kahn network, and that despite this, there 
was a strong lobby in the West which insisted on looking at each and every move 
with scepticism and questioning the credibility of the cooperation. The government of 
                                              
107 Personal email communication, 2005 
108 [online] – URL: http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/article/0,13673,501040216-588904,00.html 
109 Personal email correspondence with Zia Mian, 2005 
110 Personal email communication with Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, 2005 
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Pakistan stated that it was ready to investigate the scientists involved in smuggling, 
and would allow the international investigators to submit written questions to the 
government which would be answered by the scientists. However, it strongly rejected 
handing over its scientists to the IAEA investigating team. Furthermore, Jaspal 
added, “Pakistan is not a member of any international agreement under which it is its 
duty to open its nuclear facilities for checking”, hence the statement of the president: 
“It is an independent nation” etc.  
From an outsider’s point of view it is easy to understand that Pakistan would not 
admit IAEA inspectors into its most sensitive nuclear facilities, as this might possibly 
have compromised sensitive information. Taken to the extreme, IAEA verification of 
the non-presence of the Iranian-type centrifuges would have required inspections in 
all nuclear facilities, including those located at the top-secret Kahuta centrifuge 
complex. This was, of course, out of the question, just as it would have been in all 
other Nuclear-Weapon States. However, it is perhaps more difficult to understand 
why the government could not allow the scientists to be interviewed by international 
investigators: this need not have led to disclosure of sensitive information if 
performed in the right way. Nevertheless, it seems clear that President Musharraf’s 
statement does not lend much support to the assumption that Pakistan would be 
against verification under an FMCT, but was indeed spurred by special circumstances 
during the unveiling of the Kahn network. 
With regard to the FMCT, we should bear in mind that it is more a hypothetical 
matter than a reality for Pakistan, and that it is treated as such. According to Talat 
Masood, there has been “no serious thinking” as to how the FMCT could be 
effectively verified.111 What does seem clear is that it would have to be “non-
discriminatory” in the sense that Pakistan, India and others would have to undergo 
the same verification procedures. Ambassador Shahbaz also emphasized that all 
states parties should be equal under the FMCT and that nobody should be given 
                                              
111 Personal email communication with Lt. Gen Talat Masood, 2004 
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special rights. A second element is that verification should not be “too intrusive”. In 
other words, there is a general concern about intrusive inspections which might 
disclose information not relevant to the treaty. Minister Shaukat Hasan also 
emphasized this point: “In Pakistan there are many facilities that deliver both for 
military and civilian purposes. How do you differentiate between military and 
civilian facilities?” he asked. “There are commercial interests and there are security 
interests to be considered. How intrusive the inspections can be is an open question 
which has to be negotiated”.112 Ambassador Shahbaz expressed the same views, 
adding that his government was against  “challenge inspections”, which were 
considered “too hostile”.113 “When a country demands challenge inspections in 
another country it is basically saying that that country is lying”, he explained. 
Pakistan did not see challenge inspections as a relevant tool under the FMCT, which 
nonetheless should be a verifiable treaty. The ambassador also expressed general 
doubts about the impartiality of international inspectors. “They are only humans. Of 
course they will stumble over things which are none of their concern. Who is to know 
that they will not report it to their own government? If this was to happen, it could 
not be undone” he warned.114 Jaspal explained that this is common view shared by all 
government officials in Pakistan as well as the people. There is a considerable 
resentment felt about the unjust treatment of Pakistan by the international community. 
“Pakistan is a frontline state in the war on terrorism, worst affected. But instead of 
acknowledging its services, the international community maligns it as a terrorist state. 
For example, the bomb blasts in London [7 July 2005] were performed by British 
nationals, but the BBC tried to generate the impression that Pakistan was involved in 
that incident by saying that the three were of Pakistani origin.” 
                                              
112 Personal communication with Syed Shaukat Hasan, Geneva, 2004 
113 Challenge inspections are a special kind of inspection where one state party may require inspections in another state 
which it suspects of being in non-compliance. 
114 He also criticised the composition of weapon inspection teams in Iraq, the first of which (UNSCOM) was 50% 
Americans, some CIA. The second (UNMOVIC) consisted largely of people from Western countries. The geographically 
biased composition of the inspection teams had led to biased performance and conclusions, according to Shahbaz. 
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With regard to the costs of verifying others, we have not come across any official 
positions, although Dr Hasibullah (1997) of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission 
did express such concerns at an IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards in 
October 1997. Dr Hasibullah’s presentation, which cannot be regarded as an official 
position, dealt specifically with the establishment of new regimes such as the FMCT. 
He warned about high costs and that “the burden of costs and administrative and 
legislative reforms which poorer nations will have to bear in order to meet their 
obligations.” However, according to Jaspal there is currently no such concern 
regarding the FMCT, and it does not seem to be a relevant factor. 
5.3.3 Concerns about the costs of enforcement? 
Again, there are two kinds of enforcement costs – the costs of applying hard 
consequences on others, and the costs of having hard consequences applied on 
oneself. We shall examine both in the following. 
As with verification, Pakistan believes that any provisions for enforcement of the 
FMCT should be non-discriminatory.115 Ambassador Shahbaz also emphasized that 
all states parties to the FMCT must be treated on equal footing. A prominent example 
was the CWC, where everyone was equal. An executive council would be set up to 
oversee implementation of the agreement and to assess cases of possible non-
compliance. If non-compliance were indeed established, this would have to be 
reported to the Security Council for further action.116 
Jaspal had a more critical view: In theory, he said, it seems that the treaty could not 
be discriminatory, but considerations of Realpolitik ensured that it would be. In other 
words, Pakistan cannot be certain that it will indeed be treated on equal footing with 
the other Nuclear-Weapon States under a future FMCT. Furthermore, he said, it is 
                                              
115 Personal email communication with Lt. Gen Talat Masood, 2004 
116 Interview with Ambassador Shahbaz, 3 August 2005 
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obvious that the government ought to be concerned about the violations committed 
by its adversary [India] and the possibilities of securing its compliance. 
India’s position worldwide is growing. Often referred to as “an emerging economic 
power”, India’s strategic and military position is gaining significance as well, 
especially in Asia.117 Under the UN reforms which are currently underway, India is 
being considered as a new permanent member of the Security Council, together with 
Brazil, Japan and Germany. The United States has so far agreed only to discuss the 
issue of permanent membership with the Indians as part of their strategic dialogue 
under the New Steps in Strategic Partnership – NSSP (Tellis 2005: 28). Although the 
United States has not (yet?) signalled its support, this is obviously of great concern to 
Islamabad. Should India become a permanent member, Pakistan might perceive this 
as a significant obstacle to the possibility of checking Indian compliance under a 
future FMCT. 
With regard to its own ability to comply, the Pakistani government has not expressed 
any real concerns and does not seem concerned about hard consequences being 
applied on itself. However, as noted above, there are some segments of society who 
do have such concerns and who might be in the position to influence the government. 
This would need to be further examined. 
A hypothetical scenario is of course that Pakistan might feel threatened by India or 
some other foreign power and resort to nuclear rearmament in an effort to deter its 
enemy. Most likely there will be some kind of security clause in the FMCT allowing 
the withdrawal of a member state in case of special circumstances threatening its 
national security, e.g. war. However, should India or another foreign adversary in the 
region pursue a conventional arms build-up which Pakistan is incapable of following, 
the government might be pressured by such domestic groups as mentioned above to 
resume production of fissile material, and hence, to violate the treaty. 
                                              
117 We return to this development in the concluding part of this chapter. 
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5.3.4 Concerns about participation? 
Ambassador Shahbaz said that the FMCT will come about only when all the eight 
states concerned agree to it. Thus, it is very unlikely that Pakistan would move to 
restrict membership of the FMCT in order to save costs of verification and 
enforcement. Rather it would demand that all the eight states which are relevant 
become members when it is ready to sign the treaty for itself. Pakistani membership 
without Indian membership is of course illusive (and vice versa), and no 
consideration of costs is likely to change that. 
In fact, the main reason why Pakistan is not seriously considering the FMCT is 
because it thinks that the FMCT is not being seriously considered by India. India is 
still fortifying its nuclear arsenal, and Pakistan has to follow suit. It may take ten or 
even thirty years until Pakistan reaches its goal of minimum nuclear deterrence. 
Moreover, India is in the process of building a missile defence capability which, 
when it is deployed, will significantly reduce the value of Pakistan nuclear arsenal. 
Pakistan is unlikely to be able to afford a missile defence and might resort to further 
strengthening its offensive capacity – and, perhaps, to increased cooperation with 
China. Pakistan and China now have a mutual interest in damming up against U.S. 
and Indian supremacy.118  
In addition, the recently strengthened U.S.–India Strategic Partnership is also of 
significant concern to Pakistan: Under the “New Steps in the Strategic Partnership”, 
India has been promised delivery of advance weapons systems from the United 
States, and high-level talks will be held between the two countries on various issues 
of strategic, energy-policy and economic interest. Pakistan still supports the debate on 
the FMCT, according to Jaspal, but it is not gaining any significance at the moment. 
                                              
118 Personal communication with analyst Maria Sultan 
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5.4 Summary 
In this chapter we have analysed Pakistan’s policy on the FMCT using a pattern of 
reasons that a state may have for avoiding a deep agreement. To some degree the 
patterns coincide, suggesting that the variables may have an impact on a future 
decision about the FMCT (see below): First, Pakistan is concerned about the 
compliance of other states, India in particular. Pakistan is not so much concerned 
about the costs of verifying others (contributions to the verification system) as about 
the possibility to check possible violations by others. Second, there are at least “some 
segments of the society” who are concerned about Pakistan’s ability to comply, and 
who would also, logically, be concerned about the costs of enforcement. However, 
the government in Islamabad has not publicly expressed such concerns, and it is not 
known to what extent these “alarmist groups” have an impact on government policy. 
Pakistani officials have, however, repeatedly expressed concern about the other kind 
of verification costs –the potential loss of sensitive information. 
All things considered, there is some support for the hypothesis of Downs et al., 
provided that we are dealing with a future pattern of decision-making. At present, 
Pakistan is not ready to sign an FMCT, because it still needs to produce fissile 
material in order to reach its goal of a minimum deterrence against India. An Indian 
decision to end production and participate in the FMCT would be of utmost 
importance to Pakistan, but so far there has been no sign of this happening. 
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6. The United States and Pakistan compared 
6.1 Introduction 
As the previous chapters have revealed, there are clearly some differences as well as 
some similarities in the policies of the United States and Pakistan. In this chapter we 
will take a closer look at these issues and try to explain them. Why do the cases of the 
United States and Pakistan match the predicted pattern differently, and what does this 
tell us about the explanatory power of the theory? 
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 will compare the policies of the 
United States and Pakistan concerning the relevant variables. Section 6.3 will outline 
some explanations of the differences and discuss some points about the explanatory 
power of the theory. 
6.2 Comparative analysis 
6.2.1 Concern about non-compliance 
There seems to be a difference in U.S. and Pakistani perceptions about their own 
abilities to comply under the FMCT. Whereas the United States cannot foresee a 
situation where it would have to violate the treaty, perhaps Pakistan can. Regarding 
other states’ ability to comply, the two countries seem equally concerned, although 
Pakistan is specifically concerned about India. 
6.2.2 Concern about the costs of verification 
There is also a difference in their concern about the costs of verifying others – their 
contributions to the future FMCT verification system. While this is used as an 
argument against verification in the United States, Pakistan does not appear to have 
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such concerns. As for the costs of being verified – potential loss of sensitive 
information – they appear equally concerned, perhaps because both countries have 
very limited experience with verification and have many military secrets that they do 
not want to reveal to their adversaries. 
6.2.3 Concern about the costs of enforcement 
There is also a difference in their concern about the costs of enforcement – the 
possibility of having to face hard consequences for a violation. This follows logically 
from the concern about non-compliance above: Washington cannot foresee a 
situation where it would violate the treaty and face hard consequences, but 
Islamabad, perhaps, can. Regarding the costs of punishing others, the two countries 
also differ because the United States seems more troubled about the feasibility of 
making the whole regime work, i.e. that it will not be possible to prevent non-
compliance through verification and enforcement, only costly. Islamabad, on the 
other hand, seems mostly concerned that the regime may be discriminatory, 
punishing some violators while allowing others to get away.  
6.2.4 Concern about participation 
Full participation of all target states seems to be an absolute demand in both capitals, 
and neither would be willing to limit participation in order to reduce the costs of 
verification and enforcement. 
Pakistan is not seriously considering the FMCT because it is not being seriously 
considered by India, and because the dynamic of the strategic competition between 
the two countries is currently working in favour of India. 
The United States acknowledges that India, Pakistan and Israel are not ready to 
commit themselves to an FMCT, and that China will not commit itself as long as the 
United States is pursuing its development of advanced missile defence systems. 
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6.3 Explaining the differences 
During other treaty negotiations, the United States has appeared unable to imagine a 
situation where it would not be able to comply with the treaty in question. Analysts 
have explained this by referring to the fact that international treaties become law in 
the United States, and that U.S. citizens can sue their own government for not 
adhering to its international commitments.119 
However, with regard to the FMCT, there appear to be no actual grounds for concern 
about non-compliance, since the United States has a great deal of fissile material and 
should have no reason to produce any more. There is, arguably, a difference between 
the United States and Pakistan in terms of a possible future need for production 
which might affect their assessments about their own ability to comply. Furthermore, 
there is a difference in terms of their respective relative strength towards their main 
adversaries which would affect the extent of which they are vulnerable to other 
states’ non-compliance: Pakistan is clearly inferior to India with regard to military 
strength and would be more weakened by an Indian violation of the FMCT than the 
converse (i.e. if Pakistan were the violator and India the victim.). The United States, 
on the other hand, is by far superior to Russia and China in terms of military strength 
and would be less weakened by a Russian or Chinese violation of the FMCT than the 
converse. Thus, the argument above (cf. section 6.2.1) that the United States and 
Pakistan are equally concerned about the compliance of other states needs to be 
qualified slightly. 
With regard to concerns about the costs of verifying others, it is somewhat surprising 
that the United States appears to be concerned about its own contribution to the 
verification system while Pakistan is not, After all, the United States is far wealthier 
and should, logically, be less troubled by this than Pakistan, which is a developing 
country. However, considering that the United States is already, at least in its own 
                                              
119 I owe this point to Jon Hovi. 
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view, paying a fair share to the UN and IAEA budgets, and is inherently sceptical to 
the added value of multilateral verification to its security, such a concern can be 
explained. As for Pakistan, it might simply not have taken the issue of costs fully into 
consideration if it is indeed true that the issue of verification remains 
“hypothetical”.120 
The difference in concerns about the costs of enforcement follows logically from the 
difference in concerns about non-compliance above: If Islamabad, or some alarmist 
groups within the government, is concerned about the possible future need to produce 
more fissile material, and Washington is not, Islamabad would, logically, be more 
concerned about the hard consequences of such actions. In addition, Pakistan is more 
vulnerable to international economic or military sanctions than the United States and 
would have more reason to fear the costs of enforcement in general. 
With regard to participation, the United States and Pakistan are similar in that neither 
of the two would participate in an FMCT without full participation of all the target 
states. They differ in that, while the United States by itself would be ready to commit 
itself to an FMCT (albeit without verification), Pakistan is not ready for such a step.  
This brings us to a central point of the analysis: When full participation is deemed 
necessary, it is sufficient that only one of several target states is not ready to 
negotiate, for the treaty to be dismissed until further. The other states parties will not 
be willing to invest time and resources in negotiating a treaty with limited 
membership and value.121 Thus, the hypothesis of Downs et al could be refined by 
adding the premise of full participation into their model of decision making: If states 
are concerned about the costs of enforcement, which cannot be reduced by limiting 
the membership of the agreement (because full participation by all the target states is 
                                              
120 Cf. personal email communication with Lt. Gen. Talat Massod, 2004 
121 I.e. our analysis has shown that Pakistan is evidently not ready to halt its production of fissile material and to negotiate 
an FMCT. The United States, acknowledging this, will not spend time and resources on negotiating a treaty with very little 
value. 
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deemed necessary), they will avoid negotiating such agreements. We will return to 
this point in the conclusion. 
6.4 Summary 
In this chapter we have compared the policies of the United States and Pakistan with 
respect to the relevant variables of the analysis. There are some similarities and there 
are some differences. The differences are caused by differences in the perceived need 
for future production and in the relative economic and military strength between the 
two countries. Both cases lend support to the hypothesis of Downs et al., the United 
States albeit to a somewhat greater extent than Pakistan. 
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7. Conclusion 
This research project started out as an attempt to learn more about why the FMCT 
had not yet been negotiated. A possible explanation was found in the hypothesis of 
Downs et al. which predicted that if states were unwilling or incapable of paying the 
costs of enforcement, they would avoid so-called deep agreements. Arguably, the 
FMCT is a deep agreement, and the objective of the thesis became therefore to test 
whether the hypothesis of Downs et al. offered a valid explanation of the FMCT 
stalemate. 
The analytical strategy chosen was a “pattern- matching” strategy where we 
operationalized the variables of the hypothesis (unwillingness and incapacity) and 
compared this theoretical decision pattern with the actual policies of two potential 
FMCT member states. The two research units, the United States and Pakistan, were 
selected because of their relevance as FMCT member states and because they stand 
out as the “most different” among the eight Nuclear-Weapon states.  
Concerning the United States, the analysis showed that the predicted decision pattern 
fit quite well with Washington’s policies, indicating that the United States is 
concerned about non-compliance and about the costs of verification and enforcement, 
and that this may to some extent explain why it is reluctant to the FMCT. However, 
the main reason is that full participation is currently not deemed likely, and would 
require concessions which the United States is currently not willing to give. 
As for Pakistan, the analysis showed that to some extent the policies of Islamabad 
also coincide with the predicted decision pattern. In other words, that Pakistan also is 
concerned about non-compliance and about the costs of verification and enforcement, 
and this could lead them to avoid the FMCT in the future. At present, however, 
Pakistan is evidently not ready to commit itself to an FMCT as it still feels the need 
to produce fissile material. Further, India’s strengthened position in the region, 
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helped by the U.S.–India Strategic Partnership, is of greater concern to Pakistan than 
anything else at the moment. 
The comparative analysis has shown both differences and similarities in the policies 
of the two countries, and that the differences may be explained by real differences in 
terms of the perceived need for fissile material production in the future and, in 
particular, the relative strength of the two countries. The United States is in much 
better shape economically and in terms of security, and this may well affect its views 
about the costs of violations, whether its own or those that might be committed by 
others. 
In conclusion, the hypothesis of Downs et al. does offer a valid explanation to the 
FMCT stalemate, at least when it comes to the policies of the United States and 
Pakistan. While the analysis has shown that the case of the United States fits the 
predicted decision making pattern slightly better than the case of Pakistan, neither of 
the two countries seem particularly interested in advancing FMCT negotiations at 
present. Both countries seem to have concerns about non-compliance as well as the 
costs of verification and enforcement, and neither believes that full participation is 
likely.  
The hypothesis of Downs et al. could be slightly amended to better depict the current 
situation: If states are not willing or able to pay the cost of enforcement, which cannot 
be reduced by limiting the membership of the agreement (because full participation is 
deemed necessary) they will avoid negotiating the agreement. This appears to be 
what the United States and Pakistan are currently doing. 
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8. Appendix 1: Selected non-proliferation treaties 
and organizations122 
 
The Conference on Disarmament (CD)123 
Succeeding the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1960–1962); the Eighteen-
Nation Committee on Disarmament (1962–1968); and the Conference of the 
Committee on Disarmament (1969–1978), the CD was finally established in 1979 as 
the “single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international 
community”. The CD currently has 65 members. 
The CD is not an official UN body but has a “special relationship” with the UN: It 
meets at the UN premises in Geneva and is serviced by UN personnel, but it adopts 
its own rules of procedure and its own agenda. The CD has a permanent agenda 
which consists of a broad list of issues, including prohibition of the production of 
fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT); 
prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS); effective international 
arrangements to assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the use or threat of use of 
nuclear weapons (negative security assurances); and the cessation of the nuclear arms 
race and nuclear disarmament. 
The CD has negotiated and concluded several key arms control agreement in the past: 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 1968; the Biological 
and Toxic Weapons Convention (BWC), 1972; the Chemical Weapons Convention 
(CWC), 1992; the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 1996. However, since 
1996 the CD has been stalemated, unable to reach consensus on its programme of 
                                              
122 Sources: Inventory of International Non-Proliferation Organizations and Regimes, Monterrey Institute of International 
Studies: www.cns.miis.edu and Goldblat (1994) 
123 See also http://disarmament.un.org 
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work and to start substantive deliberations. The programme of work is a specified list 
of prioritized treaties and issues which the CD members have set forth to discuss or 
negotiate in a given calendar year. Since a programme of work has to be agreed upon 
by consensus each year, one or a few members can effectively block negotiations by 
refusing to agree to the proposed programme of work. The consensus rule also 
enables them or any CD member to demand parallel discussions or negotiations of 
other treaties or issues of their own preference. Such “issue linkage”, caused by 
disagreement over priorities, is the main reason why the CD has been rendered 
ineffective since 1996.124 
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 
Often referred to as the “cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime”, the NPT was 
concluded in 1968, entering into force in 1970. 
The NPT currently has 188 members, five of which are defined as “Nuclear-Weapon 
States”, while the rest are “Non-Nuclear Weapon States”. The definition of a 
Nuclear-Weapon State is “one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear 
weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.” (NPT Article 
IX.3) Nuclear-Weapon States are thus: the United States, Russia (succeeding the 
Soviet Union), the United Kingdom, France and China. Because India, Pakistan and 
Israel did not test prior to 1 January 1967, they could not be acknowledged as 
Nuclear-Weapon States. Hence, they have not joined the treaty. 
Key provisions of the NPT are the following:  
• Nuclear-Weapon States are not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices… (NPT Article I) 
                                              
124 Notably, the CD did manage to agree on a programme of work during the third and final session of 1998. In the autumn 
of 1998, an ad hoc committee for negotiations of the FMCT was established, and CD members negotiated for three weeks 
before the session ended. 
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• Non-Nuclear Weapon States are not to receive nuclear weapons or any other 
nuclear explosive devices from any transferor, and not to manufacture or 
require them (NPT Article II) 
• Non-Nuclear Weapon States are to place all nuclear materials in all peaceful 
nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards (NPT Article III) 
• All parties are obligated to facilitate and participate in the exchange of 
equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy (NPT Article IV) 
• All parties must pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures 
related to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament, 
and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective 
international control (NPT Article VI) 
 
The NPT thus has both a non-proliferation and a disarmament component. Its 
objective is both to “facilitate … the exchange of equipment, materials etc. for 
peaceful uses” and to control such nuclear activities in the Non-Nuclear Weapon 
States by applying safeguards. 
The key decision-making bodies are the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, 
see below) and the NPT Review Conference. An NPT Review Conference is held 
every five years to review implementation of the treaty and to make decisions on 
improvement. At the 1995 Review Conference it was decided that, for the purpose of 
strengthening the review process, a series of Preparatory Committees should be held 
in the run-up to each Review Conference. Accordingly, prior to this year’s (2005) 
Review Conference, three Preparatory Committees were held: in 2002, 2003 and 
2004. 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)125 
In 1953, US President Eisenhower proposed the “Atoms for Peace” plan to the UN 
General Assembly. This was an ambitious US- and Soviet-led programme to promote 
the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Under it the United States and the Soviet Union 
                                              
125 See also www.iaea.org 
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would provide some fissile material to an international agency to be established under 
the aegis of the UN. This led to the establishment of the IAEA in 1956. 
The key provisions of the IAEA are the following: 
• To encourage and assist research on, and development and practical 
application of, atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world… (IAEA 
Statutes Article III.A.1) 
• To make provision, in accordance with this Statute, for materials, services, 
equipment, and facilities to meet the needs of research on, and development 
and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful purposes… (IAEA 
Statutes Article III.A.2) 
• To establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special 
fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information 
made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or 
control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose… (IAEA 
Statutes Article III.A.5) 
 
Similar to the NPT, IAEA Statutes both provide for the promotion of the peaceful use 
of nuclear energy and for the control of such activities through international 
verification  safeguards. 
After the NPT was concluded, the IAEA was given the responsibility for verification 
of the peaceful nuclear activities of the Non-Nuclear Weapon States. The model for 
safeguards agreements which the IAEA signs with the Non-Nuclear Weapon States 
(as required under NPT Article IV) is the INFIRC 153/Rev model. This is a 
comprehensive safeguards model in the sense that it covers all declared nuclear 
activities – self-made and of foreign origin – in the Non-Nuclear Weapon States. It 
differs from the original safeguards model (INFIRC 66), which applies only to certain 
material, services, equipment, facilities etc. that have been made available by the 
IAEA (cf. Statutes Article III.A.5). It also differs from the new and improved 
safeguards model (INFIRC 540), which enables the IAEA to inspect nuclear sites 
which have not been declared by their governments, and to make use of new 
technologies. It was the discovery of Iraq’s secret nuclear programme in the early 
1990s that spurred the development of a new safeguards model. The intention is that 
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this model will make it far more difficult for potential violators to conceal nuclear 
activities from IAEA inspectors. 
Accordingly, it is the IAEA that performs verification of compliance by the Non-
Nuclear Weapon States under the NPT (i.e. that they are not receiving nuclear 
weapons or manufacturing them on their own.). The IAEA also performs verification 
at some facilities in the non-NPT states (those which have been made available by the 
agency) and in the Nuclear-Weapon States. Unlike the Non-Nuclear Weapon States, 
the Nuclear-Weapon States are not required to place their peaceful nuclear activities 
under IAEA safeguards. Nonetheless, they have made  Voluntary Safeguards 
Agreements with the IAEA under which they have submitted some facilities and 
some material for inspection as a sign of good faith. 
The key decision-making bodies of the IAEA are the 35-member strong Board of 
Governors and the General Conference, which meets once a year. 
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)126 
The CTBT, concluded in 1996, is the latest accomplishment of the CD. The CTBT 
has 115 members (countries which have signed and ratified the treaty), but has not 
entered into force because ratification of 44 listed states is required, of which only 32 
have done to date. The United States has signed but not ratified the treaty. The policy 
of the Bush administration is that while it has no plans for seeking reconsideration of 
the Senate’s refusal to ratify the treaty (in 1999), it continues to observe its 
moratorium on nuclear testing, in effect since 1992. Pakistan has neither signed nor 
ratified the treaty; the same applies for India and for North Korea. 
 
 
                                              
126 See also www.ctbto.org 
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The Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) 
The CTBT and the FMCT fill complementary roles: While the CTBT provides a ban 
on testing and the qualitative improvement of nuclear weaponry, the FMCT provides 
a ban on its quantitative augmentation. If it is negotiated, an FMCT would cap the 
production of fissile material for weapons purposes in the member states. 
However, so far an FMCT exists only on the drawing board. The reasons for this, it 
appears, are limited interest in some of the Nuclear-Weapon States, the linkage 
problem of the CD (see above), disagreement on what should be the scope of the 
treaty (should it only provide a ban on future production, or should it also include 
cuts in existing stockpiles of fissile material?) and its verification mechanisms. The 
objective of this thesis has been to examine one possible explanation of the FMCT 
stalemate: the unwillingness or incapacity of some relevant member states to pay the 
costs of enforcement. 
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